Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

860H.00/7–1048: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union ¹

top secret

Washington, July 21, 1948—1 p. m.

830. For the Ambassador’s eyes only. We here all in full agreement desirability utmost circumspection in present Yugoslav situation and, in line policy set forth Dept Circtel June 30, 7 pm,² we feel that, while we should not repulse any advances made by Tito towards closer association with the West, we should await Tito’s approaches and should handle such approaches for economic assistance on merits, in light prevailing considerations each case. On basis that policy we have welcomed satisfactory conclusion July 19 of long standing US–Yugos financial negotiations, we have approved Yugos request to AMG Trieste to purchase certain petroleum supplies and are gratified similar British response to Yugos desire to purchase petroleum from UK. London’s 3105, July 10³ and 2920, July 1⁴ seem to indicate British concur our thinking and according Sforza⁵ Italians take parallel view.

Ambassadors generally concurs policy of Dept circtel abovementioned. However, he believes that, in effort strengthen Tito’s determination resist Moscow, advisable we take steps provide more positive encouragement as to measure economic aid we are prepared to extend Yugos at least on short term. Specifically, he urges that we take initiative in secret approach Tito stating we disposed enter discussions with him any subject he might desire. Harriman would envisage offering dispatch one or two tankers if necessary keep Tito’s air force or military transport operative and tell him if he is attacked we would furnish him supplies by sea or parachute. If Tito desires comprehensive trade treaties or loan, Harriman would inform him that, while we will consider such request, prior evidence his good faith in regard various aspects present Yugos policy, for example revision Yugos position of aiding Markos, would be conditions precedent. Harriman’s reasoning predicated conviction that Yugos defection major deterrent to attack against western powers by Soviets who unlikely embark military venture so long as their Balkan bastion thus insecure.

Your personal comments Harriman’s analysis and suggestions in light your previous estimates (urtels 1221, July 1, 1233, July 2, etc.,) will be appreciated.

Marshall

1. A substantially identical message was sent to London as telegram 2845, July 21, not printed.
2. Not printed; it contained the text of the conclusions of Policy Planning Staff paper 35, June 30, 1948, p. 1079.
3. Not printed; it reported that a British Foreign Office official, in commenting on the attitude that the Western powers should adopt toward Yugoslavia, stated that the Foreign Office believed “we should try ‘to keep Tito alive and kicking’ so long as this could be done quietly and providing, for the time being, it involved no overt or public action on our part.” (860H.00/7–1048)
4. Not printed.
5. Telegram 3051, July 16, from Rome, not printed, reported that Italian Foreign Minister Carlo Sforza had suggested that he hoped that the various governments such as the United States would not take steps openly to assist or support Tito because this might interfere with the natural forces of this schism and provide some basis for questioning Tito’s sincerity (860H.00/7–1648).