Executive Secretariat Files, Lot 63–D351
Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary of the Council (Souers)
NSC 5/3
The Position of the United States With Respect to the Use of US Military Power in Greece
the problem
1. To assess and appraise the position of the United States with respect to the use of US military power in Greece.
analysis
2. The National Security Council in NSC 5/21 (para. 12) concluded that: “As a necessary basis for any future decision to use US military power as visualized in paragraph 8c, the National Security Council Staff should obtain and correlate comments and recommendations from the following Departments and Agencies upon each of the courses of action enumerated in paragraph 8:
- a.
- The Department of State
- b.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff
- c.
- The National Security Resources Board
- d.
- The Central Intelligence Agency.”
3. Para. 8c of NSC 5/2 referred to above, defines one possible US course of action as follows: “To continue and strengthen the present type of aid to Greece, combined with one or more of the following uses of US military power:
- (1)
- Dispatch of a token armed force to Greece.
- (2)
- Employment in Greece of available US armed forces to take such action as is necessary to assist in preventing Communist domination of Greece.
- (3)
- Strengthening US military forces in the Mediterranean area, outside of Greece, at such places and in such manner as would be deemed most effective.
- (4)
- Initiation of partial mobilization within the United States as an indication of determination to resist Communist expansion.”
4. NSC 5/2 was approved at a time when the operations of the Greek National Army held little promise of success. Since that time, the United States has extended the Greek aid program for one year, the Greek Army has exhibited greater offensive spirit, and the operational advice extended by US military representatives has improved the operational efficiency of the GNA. Moreover satellite aid to Markos has been on a lesser scale than apparent preparations would have supported, [Page 94] with a corresponding effect on anticipated guerrilla capabilities. This default must be attributed to deliberate Soviet policy. It has caused misgivings in the Markos camp, where there may be increasing realization that the Soviet purpose may not be to bring Markos to power in Greece, but only to use the Greek Communists to impose economic attrition on the United States. Meanwhile the Greek Army has recently achieved some initial successes in its operation against the guerrillas. The current situation with respect to satellite aid remaining unchanged, the Greek Army may be able to eliminate the guerrillas as a major obstacle to Greek recovery. The USSR retains, however, the capability of causing an augmentation of satellite aid sufficient to render doubtful the achievement of a military decision, and will probably make use of this capability unless there is a general revision of Soviet policy in consequence of developments outside of Greece. In short, the prospects in Greece have considerably improved, but a favorable outcome is by no means assured.
5. Representatives of the Department of State are of the opinion that popular and Congressional support for the use of US military power as envisaged in para. 8c of NSC 5/2 would be forthcoming, provided such use is clearly demonstrated to be in the interest of national security and in conformity with and in defense of the basic principles of the United Nations. Further, the State Department representatives believe there would be no appreciable adverse reaction within the UN or throughout the world other than from Communist dominated or border line states to the uses of US military power as envisaged in para. 8c.
[Paragraph 6 is not printed.]
7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaking to the military implications of the courses of action set forth above, emphasize that the over-all world situation indicates the necessity for strengthening immediately the potential of the National Military Establishment.2 To this end some form of compulsory military service should be initiated at once. Deployment of US troops in appreciable numbers to the Eastern Mediterranean or the Middle East would make partial mobilization a necessity. Every effort should be made to avoid military commitment with implications extending to likelihood of major military involvement unless preceded by the partial mobilization recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This mobilization would include not only increased military manpower and increased appropriations necessary for strengthening the potential of our National Military Establishment in all respects, but also the necessary statutory authorization for [Page 95] civilian and industrial readiness, corresponding to those found essential during World War II, and to be invoked as and to the extent required.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the dispatch of forces, token or in strength, to Greece would be militarily unsound.
- a.
- Unless it is known that we are ready and able to back them up to any extent that will be reasonably necessary; and
- b.
- Unless our best intelligence indicates that such a move will not precipitate overt action by Soviet or satellite forces, since neither the geographical position and terrain of Greece nor our over-all military strategy justify commitment to major operations in that country; and
- c.
- Unless we have determined that we neither need nor intend to undertake military action elsewhere with our currently relatively weak forces.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that in the light of the obviously worsening world situation certain measures equivalent to the initiation of mobilization be taken now (see Annex).
8. The National Security Resources Board concurs with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in recommending that “the necessary statutory authorizations for civilian and industrial readiness … be invoked as and to the extent required.”
conclusions
9. The United States should not now send armed forces to Greece as token forces or for military operations.
10. If the situation in Greece should deteriorate and, in any event not later than November 1, the National Security Council should reconsider the problem.
11. Decisions as to (a) the strengthening of US military forces in the Mediterranean area, and (b) the adoption of measures equivalent to the initiation of mobilization, should be made in the light of the over-all world situation and not primarily as a contribution to the solution of the problem in Greece.