761.00/9–2848: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State
2156. Main recent developments affecting Embassy’s previous estimate Soviet willingness engage world hostilities near future (despatch 315 April 1) are presumable:
(a) Tito’s revolt from Cominform fold; and (b) German developments and Berlin situation.
As indicated mytel 2141 September 26,1 Tito–Cominform conflict probably not as likely to have adversely affected Kremlin’s attitude towards war as has been generally believed.
Course of quadripartite negotiations Moscow regarding Berlin blockade certainly support our previous estimate that Soviets not expecting or planning resort actual hostilities at this time, but are still hoping realize their objectives by means short of war. These negotiations also suggest Kremlin convinced Western Powers will not risk use of force to break Berlin siege. However, present Berlin situation contains [Page 920] grave implications inevitably connected with irrestible force (Soviet squeeze) meeting immovable (western determination plus airlift), with resultant dangers of serious incidents and possibly eventual explosion. In addition, present program western occupation powers has brought Soviets face to face with prospect of unified western Germany, including vital Ruhr, from control of which SMA completely eliminated, and tied into western bloc and its gradual economic recovery. Kremlin must view such development not only as increasing barrier to realization Soviet-Communist objectives outside satellite areas but even as growing threat to Soviet bloc security. Hence Soviet leadership may now be somewhat more inclined than previously to accept inevitability of near future actual hostilities. On both counts therefore, Berlin-German developments have probably increased danger of Kremlin’s resorting war.
Though our lead in atomic warfare possibilities is presumably still a key factor in deterring Soviets, and they must also realize their inability carry through any such war to decisive successful conclusion, danger exists, in addition above considerations, that prospect of growing western power, both military and economic, might induce decision that it’s “now or never”, in expectation that hostilities now would at least forestall this growing western strength and establish impregnable Communist bloc throughout European continent, strategic Near East and continental Far East, from which bases capitalist enemy could be contained and gradually reduced in his remaining areas control.
While past record European military campaigns suggests attack would normally not be launched during winter months, and there are still no signs of sizeable Soviet build-up for operations such magnitude, Red Army could secure immediate objectives without difficulty any time during coming winter, particularly in view bad flying weather and present availability Soviet equipment suited winter operations Europe as contrasted western difficulties in latter connection.
On whole, review confirms our basic conclusion last April that “Soviet Union will not deliberately resort to war in immediate future but will continue to attempt to secure its objectives by other means.” However, developments meanwhile seem to us to have brought nearer conditions which might impel Kremlin decision to undertake war and we accordingly believe next six months or year probably critical in deciding this issue.
Above estimate worked out in conjunction MA, NA and AA; Dept please pass to Depts of Army Navy Air Force.
Sent Dept as 2156, Dept pass London as 243, Paris for Gadel as 402, Berlin as 419.
- Not printed.↩