Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

800.00B Communist International/6–2448: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

secret

London, June 24, 1948—6 p. m.

2780. Foreign Office has as yet received no reliable intelligence re Molotov meeting Warsaw with Foreign Ministers satellites. Foreign Office speculates that presence Molotov may indicate some uncertainty course CP policy but that important new policy directives may be given satellites and Cominform.¹ It is believed meeting called primarily to consider future action and policy east Germany and Foreign Office has received report that Soviets may be prepared to make some territorial concessions to Germans at expense of Poles. (Warsaw telegram to Department 914, June 23.²)

Prior to learning of Warsaw meeting Hankey,³ head Northern Department Foreign Office, informed Embassy officer he was inclined to believe Soviet “peace offensive” had now ended and that Western powers could expect renewal of Russian diplomatic offensive. (RefEmbtel 2604, June 11.²) While this is not yet considered view of Foreign Office Hankey mentioned in support this conclusion Communist strike action in France, the serious disturbances in southeast Asia which he believes Communists inspired, and what he termed Marshal Sokolovsky’s⁴ “violent” reaction to announcement on currency reform in western zone of Germany. Hankey felt Soviet action Berlin and Germany hardly compatible with continuation “peace offensive.” Hankey speculated that Markos might now be too much of a liability for Soviets and this might be partial explanation Greek-Bulgarian negotiations for reestablishment diplomatic relations.

Hankey stated he was relieved to see end of “peace offensive” because he feared that signs of “peaceful” Soviet intentions would delude an important segment of British public into belief that agreement with USSR was possible at present time. Russian abandonment of “peace offensive” would insure that British public would remain firmly united behind Bevin’s policies. “If US and UK remain united and firm they can be confident of their own security”.

Embassy inclined to believe Hankey may exaggerate significance of recent Soviet “peace offensive” on British public. As previously reported by Embassy gap between government and non-Communist left-wing of Labor Party has now been virtually closed. Embassy believes this has occurred primarily because of developments of US and Soviet policies over past six to ten months. Communist coup Czechoslovakia destroyed last illusions which remains some important elements Labor Party. Bevin informed economic counselor of Embassy⁵ on June 17 that he was “very pleased” at reception he had been accorded at recent meeting of Parliamentary Labor Party and that he now believed there were “only five or six” Labor MP’s who were fundamentally opposed to his policies. While Embassy believes past “peace offensive” has had little effect on British public it is of course true that future solidarity Parliamentary Labor Party depends in large part on future trends US and Soviet policies.

Sent Department 2780; Paris 313; Moscow 109; Warsaw 48; Berlin 231; Budapest 35; Sofia 30; Bucharest 26; Athens 58; Belgrade.

Douglas

1. For documentation on the creation of the Communist Information Bureau, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. iv, pp. 594–616, passim.
2. Not printed.
3. Robert Maurice Alers Hankey.
2. Not printed.
4. Marshal Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky, Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAG), 1946–1949.
5. Bon C. Bliss.