711.00/6–848: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
1067. For the Secretary’s eyes only from Smith. Realize you are fully aware of adverse effect on our foreign policy of some recent US moves, but think it might help you to have result of my own observations in Moscow.
While many of my colleagues realize unfortunate circumstances attendant on election year, they are nevertheless showing increasing alarm and growing doubt as to constancy and firmness of our announced policies. Most of Europe still remembers President Wilson’s high promises of cooperation and support and ultimate tragic result thereof, and it is very apparent that many Western European observers are wondering more and more if it is wise to tie unequivocally to a US policy which may change over night.
This feeling seems to be more pronounced among French and Belgians. French thinking in regard Germany of course is influenced strongly when ERP funds are in question, particularly just at time of French debate on London Agreement.1 Confirmation of lessening of confidence in US apparent in letters just received from two friends in French Government. That from Jean Monnet2 understandable as [Page 885] he is inclined to be skeptical, but one from René Mayer3 shows same feeling and this disturbing.
Belgian Ambassador4 here has been open and pointed in his criticism of recent apparent instability of US policy, and as he is Spaak’s personal selection and seems to enjoy his confidence, his opinions from Moscow will probably have considerable weight.
Luxembourg Minister5 has been equally critical. Report of these individuals to their governments undoubtedly reflect this view.
Member of Dutch trade delegation here, after praising ERP and stressing Dutch desire to adhere to firm US policy re Soviet Union, remarked that while it was difficult for Americans to realize, Dutch were painfully aware of fact that Soviet frontier is only 120 miles from Holland and other Western European countries are in comparable situation. During trade negotiations he had definite impression that because of ERP, victory in Italy and firm US statements, Dutch were in very favorable position and received several concessions which were fruits of US policy and its results in Western Europe. He doubted if somewhat conciliatory Soviet attitude would continue if cracks began to appear in wall of western defense.
Soviet press has been quick to exploit House action on decreasing “Marshall Plan” funds, and quotes several representatives to effect that further aid expenditures would result in severe inflation and consequent depression in US. Other representatives quoted to effect that England should be refused aid for reason that US and British interests bound to clash on almost all questions. Today’s Pravda quoting France Presse says: “The preliminary agreement on Western Germany reached in London depends directly upon the accomplishment of the Marshall Plan. It would be hard for Parliament and French public opinion to accept fact that the aid promised them would be constantly subject to review in light of one political situation or another, while the serious concessions made by France in her policy towards Germany have led her along a path on which she can rightly expect the minimum of continuity of purpose from her partners”.
My Middle East colleagues still speak, but that is about all. They are bewildered by our Palestine policy, and realizing as they do that Soviet Union is working toward seizure of power by “democratic elements” which will oppose Americans and British in Middle East, they see our recent actions as naive and indicative of unfriendly viewpoint.
To me this adds up to deterioration US prestige and growing lack of confidence in reliability of our announced policies, regrettable after [Page 886] recent substantial gains in Italy and major accomplishments in Western Europe during last six months.
I note in recent airgram that Department is reconsidering its policy regarding Dutch East Indies dispute,6 based on allegation that while Republicans are not living up to agreements, Dutch are also culpable. Without knowing any of details, cannot help but feel in view general world picture, that we should go very easy before bending over backwards to be “fair” to the Republicans at risk of unduly alienating Dutch in the process. Of course if Dutch are flagrantly breaking letter and spirit of agreements we should make our position clear to them. On other hand, it should be constantly borne in mind that one of major objectives of Soviet policy is to “Balkanize” and fragmentize colonial areas under a slogan of “democracy and independence” in order to weaken western strength and facilitate Communist infiltration. Would think “that undue encouragements such groups as Netherlands East Indies Republicans or drastic action against Dutch would materially promote Soviet aims. Recent Soviet effort to establish consular relations with Netherlands East Indies Republicans points up their disregard of Renville Agreements7 and anxiety to get official foot in the door.
Sending this eyes only simply to protect personal references to individuals.
- In vol. ii, Part E of Chapter I, The London Conference on Germany, contains documents on the French consideration of the recommendations of the London Conference.↩
- Commissioner General of the Plan for Modernization and Reequipment of the French economy.↩
- Minister of Finance in the French cabinet.↩
- Louis Goffin.↩
- René Blum.↩
- For documentation, see vol. vi, pp. 57 ff.↩
- See telegram 60 from Batavia on Jan. 19, 1948, ibid., p. 79. For the text of the agreements signed on Jan. 17, on board the cruiser U.S.S. Renville, see Department of State Bulletin, March 14, 1948, pp. 334–336.↩