711.61/5–1748: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State
930. Evidence from other capitals indicates considerable portion world press and opinion continues to hold view Molotov gave favorable response to American bid for talks on outstanding difficulties, which USA now trying reject, and which reflected basic American weakness and lack reliability.1 World Communist apparatus is actively promoting [Page 870] this interpretation and will clearly continue assiduously to do so in forthcoming weeks. Intent Soviet Government both originally create and now develop and spread this false idea clearly seen all Soviet press comment and action Soviet censorship in cutting from copy American correspondents any suggestion Molotov reply constituted definite negative reaction and effectively precluded any real further discussions. Soviet press craftily quotes and bases comment on grossly distorted version Ambassador’s statements published by Tass, particularly final paragraph omitting key sentence making clear only Soviet Government could make next move. Following from Moscow Bolshevik May 15 typical:
“Any one who studied attentively the concluding section of the statement of the US Ambassador Smith, had the right to suppose that, despite its diffuseness and a certain indefiniteness, it contained readiness on the part of the US Government for exhaustive discussion and settlement of the differences between the USA and the USSR. To the astonishment of world society, however, literally on the day following the publication of the statements the US Government itself repudiated its own positive initiative, the anxiety of the American public about the future of peace and above all about the future of the American people itself, laid its stamp also on Smith’s statement. It did not look as though the authors of this statement were guided by absolute confidence in the future of the country if they found it necessary to give assurances that their policy would not alter in connection with the forthcoming elections and the possible economic crisis. Clearly these questions are alarming the American public, for it is plain enough that they come into the category of internal American and not international problems.”
In circumstances, despite official statements already made, believe we still need on authoritative US Government level specifically expose purposeful distortion and duplicity of Molotov reply and explain in words of one syllable why nominal “yes” response of Soviet Government actually meant firm “no”. This might well take form of major public address by Secretary or other, high official, reviewing Soviet Government handling and exploitation Molotov–Smith conversations in light entire record USA–USSR relations.
Department pass Paris for Ambassador Smith Moscow’s 141.
- The first Soviet press comment on the Smith-Molotov exchange appeared on May 14 and was reported by Chargé Durbrow in telegram 910 from Moscow, not printed. This had been in two articles in Pravda and Trud, which were based on foreign press reactions. They emphasized that the United States initiative resulted from the need to relieve war psychosis in the United States; that there was general world satisfaction, including the United States, at the acceptance of the proposal by the Soviet Union; and that subsequent efforts had been made by the United States to withdraw from the initial position and to insist that no proposal for negotiations was ever intended (711.61/5–1448).↩