711.61/5–1248: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State

secret

890. In light of recent indications that Kremlin was moving toward lessening of pressure in Western Europe, yesterday’s Soviet propaganda coup has among other aims adroit exploitation of Ambassador’s conversations with Molotov to cover recent setbacks in West without loss of face by inferring US desire appease as excuse for their planned retrenchment. As of the moment, it would seem to have been more than successful, since its objectives have not only been attained, but Soviet prestige has actually increased in the process. Absence of any reference in Molotov’s statement to problems of Middle and Far East appears noteworthy in this connection.

As reported in Embtel 520, March 22, Embassy has been expecting Kremlin would soon seek opportunity to spread some sweetness and light in effort to reassure Soviet friends and twilight sleepers abroad as well as citizenry at home. Henry Wallace’s1 efforts in US have for some time stood in need of this form of encouragement and nervous instability Soviet and European public clearly revealed by speed with which it clutched yesterday at the straw of American-Soviet rapprochement.

This incident is first serious attack in what will no doubt prove to be long psychological warfare offensive designed to undermine growing, resistance to Soviet expansionism both in Europe and America. From long-range point of view it seems likely yesterday’s gambit will be followed by other moves aimed at same objective. Since it is now wholly clear Soviet Government will be deflected from set course only by eventual development of external forces compelling such deflection, it is doubly important that we hold firm and act positively to effect the containment of Soviet expansionism.

At the same time, it should be kept clearly in mind that these recent developments will probably prove to have as corollary significance [Page 866] early application increased Soviet pressure in another world sector which in present circumstances is most likely to be Middle East.2

Department pass Paris unnumbered for Smith, London 54.

Durbrow
  1. Henry Agard Wallace was Secretary of Commerce in the cabinet of President Truman until his resignation was requested on September 20, 1946. For information about the letter of July 23 written by him to the President (published on September 18), and his speech of September 12, critical of the trends in international affairs since the end of the war and of the policies toward the Soviet Union pursued by the President, see telegram 3484 from Moscow on September 16, and telegram 3532 from Moscow on September 20, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vi, p. 782 and p. 783.
  2. At the 177th meeting of the Policy Planning Staff held on May 12 these conclusions were reached about the significance of the publication by the Soviet Union of the exchange of communications: “It was agreed that the Russians scored a temporary propaganda victory which may last only a short time if the situation is handled properly by our information agencies; that the action of the Russians in publishing the communications indicates that they have no desire seriously to enter into discussions on points at issue; that the misunderstanding created abroad by the issuance of the exchange of communications was due largely to the fact that the initial impression was received from the incomplete text released by Moscow; that our diplomatic officers abroad should study carefully the exchange of communications, the President’s statement of yesterday, and the Secretary’s statement of today and should ask that the Governments to which they are accredited also examine them carefully; that it would not have Leen possible to consult the British and other Governments ahead of time for rear of a leak; that even though the Russians did the unprecedented by making these communications public, it was still wise to have set forth our position at this time as we did.” (Policy Planning Staff Files, Lot 64 D 563)