Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

711.61/5–1148

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

confidential

[Washington,] May 11, 1948.

Lord Inverchapel called on me at the request of Mr. Bevin to discuss the talks between Foreign Minister Molotov and Ambassador Smith.

Lord Inverchapel said that Mr. Bevin was disturbed at this news and feared that it would create confusion among the nations of western Europe, particularly as there had been no advance notice from the United States Government concerning any such conversations. Lord Inverchapel pointed out in this connection that Mr. Bevin had had nothing but the Soviet radio version and that he had come to ascertain the true fact of the matter from me.

I read to Lord Inverchapel (who had not yet received a copy of the Department’s release of Ambassador Smith’s statement) the actual statement which Ambassador Smith had made to Mr. Molotov and the comments he had made to Mr. Molotov concerning the Soviet reply. I outlined to the Ambassador the considerations we had had in mind in instructing Ambassador Smith to state the position of the United States to Mr. Moloto. I made it clear to him, as the text of the message shows, that there was no “proposal” to any specific negotiations but that the main purpose of the statement was to make sure that the Soviet Government had directly from this Government a clear statement of United States position and purposes in view of the very real possibility of a Soviet misconception as to our intentions if they were to judge solely from speeches and newspaper articles and the usual accompaniments of a Presidential campaign. I said I thought the statement which I had just read, a copy of which would of course be given to him, made it entirely clear that there was nothing new in the statement concerning American policy and therefore represented no change whatsoever.

Lord Inverchapel said he understood, and said that if Mr. Bevin had had the full account and not merely the Soviet version, he would not have been so concerned.² He added, however, that Mr. Bevin did regret not having been consulted or informed in advance.

I told him that because of the serious danger of a leak in a matter of this kind, it had been held in the strictest secrecy and confined to only very few people in the Department and that I had not even, although I had of course informed the President, left a copy in the White House. I also pointed out that we had only received the Soviet reply yesterday and had hardly had time to study it before the Russians put it out on the radio.

Lord Inverchapel inquired what we thought the Soviet motives had been in immediately publicizing this exchange as they had done and Mr. Kennan replied that in his opinion they had done it in large measure for the effect on their own population and the other populations of the satellite countries. I said I agreed with this analysis and felt that sometimes we underestimate the problem that the Russians had with their own people and in particular with the satellites they control; “that the people of eastern Europe must be very nervous at any prospect of war and at the prospect of being bombed. I added, however, that I thought the Soviets may have had an eye on the possible slowing down effect in Congress on the military measure.

As he was leaving, I gave Lord Inverchapel a copy of the original Smith statement, a copy of his comments on Mr. Molotov’s reply and a copy of the President’s press release which had just been made.³

1. Those present at this conversation were the Secretary of State, the British Ambassador Lord Inverchapel, Mr. George F. Kennan, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, and Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the Department of State. The latter actually composed this memorandum.
2. Later on May 11 Lord Inverchapel sent a message to the Secretary in which he further explained Mr. Bevin’s complete surprise and wonderment whether the exchanges in Moscow “represents a change in United States foreign policy.” Mr. Bevin had telegraphed that “this unexpected development raises very grave doubts in the minds of His Majesty’s Government as to what may be intended.” This was particularly important to know because Mr. Bevin had said that “His Majesty’s Government are pursuing their present policies in regard to Western Germany and Western Union on the strength of United States assurances. Mr. Bevin presumes that they are to continue. He says that a further assurance on this point is very vital to restore confidence.” Lord Inverchapel expressed his opinion that Mr. Bevin would surely welcome “a little personal message” from Secretary Marshall “assuring him that United States policy is unchanged.” (711.61/5–1148)
3. The French Ambassador Henri Bonnet also called upon Secretary of State Marshall on May 11 at the request of Foreign Minister Georges Bidault who “was particularly concerned as to the possible effect these exchanges might have on the tripartite discussions on Germany.” The ambassador was given assurances by Mr. Marshall, who told him that “of course this country would never discuss with the Soviet Union any matters affecting the interests of others.” (711.01/5–1148)