501.BB Palestine/4–1248
Draft Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
If the question of a UN security force in Palestine arises at the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly,1 a proposal for the participation of a Soviet contingent may be expected. The problem is to set forth the reasons, which the U.S. delegate may make available in his discretion for the confidential background information of certain foreign delegates, for our firm opposition to such a proposal.
The Soviet Union has pursued a consistent policy of conducting military occupation upon a zonal basis under the exclusive command of its own military authorities. Under such conditions of absolute military control, it has been in a position to accomplish independently and with a minimum of foreign interference its political aim of fashioning the controlled area in the image of a Communist state. It has never agreed to any form of military occupation whereunder its absolute control would be questioned, since such an infringement upon its independence of action would prejudice the successful execution of its political design. This was forcefully illustrated at Potsdam, when Stalin categorically refused to agree to any participation of Soviet troops in an Allied occupation of Japan under a foreign commander. He insisted that under no circumstances would Soviet troops take part in such an occupation except under a Soviet command and within their own military zone. The adamant stand of the Soviet Union on this issue was a determining factor in precluding its participation in the Japanese occupation. In the light of its stubborn insistence then upon its own zonal command, when an acceptance of the Allied position would have nevertheless offered many positive advantages, it appears highly improbable that the Soviet Union would agree to participate in a security force in Palestine under any other conditions. [Page 826] It has been demonstrated what political consequences would result from Soviet participation on these terms. On the evidence of the record, the participation of Soviet troops in a security force in Palestine would be manifestly unacceptable.
The record of Soviet military occupation is clear. Soviet military occupation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in 1940 led to the forcible incorporation of these countries into the Soviet Union. It has given Moscow complete control of the administration of the Soviet zones in Germany, Austria and Korea. In addition, it has proved a determining factor in establishing Communist-controlled governments in Poland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria and in influencing their immediate neighbors to create governments of a similar political complexion. Wherever Soviet military occupation has occurred, it has consistently been accompanied by the political reorganization along Communist lines of the Soviet occupied zone. It is therefore axiomatic that if a Soviet contingent were permitted to participate in a UN security force in Palestine, the same pattern of Communist control might be expected to emerge within the area occupied by Soviet troops.
Communist tactics in countries subjected to Soviet military occupation have followed a familiar and clearly defined pattern. During the period of occupation, coalition governments containing representatives of so-called democratic and anti-fascist parties were established with the key posts of Minister of the Interior, Minister of Propaganda and Minister of Education invariably held by Communists. Sooner or later the leaders of the non-Communist parties participating in the coalition were forced to accept and support the Communist program or, if they opposed it, were smeared and were convicted of treason in disloyalty trials or forced to flee the country. Communist domination of such governments has been given a semblance of legality by the holding of elections in which, by the use of various forms of pressure and fraudulent practices, the Communist parties succeeded in polling a much larger vote than they would have attained in a fair election. Thus firmly entrenched in the seat of authority, they have proceeded to the final phase in the struggle for power, the liquidation of whatever opposition remained and the establishment of a single party dictatorship subservient to the dictates of Moscow.
The example of the Baltic states provides a concrete illustration of the political consequences of Soviet military occupation. Mr. Molotov, then Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, had stated as late as October 31, 1939: “We declare that all nonsense about Sovietizing the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies.” Nonetheless, and despite the existence of non-aggression pacts with those countries, they were overrun the next year by the Red Army. [Page 827] Political parties and organizations were immediately outlawed, and a Communist Party was established. All individuals suspected of opposing the Communist regime were arrested or exiled. Elections were, ordered, and a single election list was drawn up, the only persons eligible for candidacy being those appointed by the Communist-operated Working Peoples Union. After the elections, the Soviet military authorities announced that the vote in Lithuania had been 99.19% pro-Soviet. Similar results were obtained in Latvia and Estonia. The new assemblies met and petitioned for incorporation of the three states into the USSR.
A more recent example of the political consequences of Soviet military occupation is that offered by the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, which has conducted within its zone a similar unilateral policy with respect to political activity. The Potsdam Agreement had envisaged that local self-government would be established throughout Germany on democratic principles. In practice the Soviet Military Administration, through its pervasive intervention in all aspects of German public life, has subverted democratic forms and set the pattern for a totalitarian state. The Socialist Party was suppressed by the imposed amalgamation with the Communist Party into the Socialist Unity Party, which has become essentially a “state party” and the principal German instrument of Soviet military control. Numerous front organizations representing labor, youth, peasant and women’s associations have been created as expressions of “mass” or “new type” democratic action and are effective auxiliaries to the Socialist Unity Party. Through arbitrary interference by the Soviet Military Administration, relying upon the influence of the Socialist Unity Party at all levels and the strong arm of a centrally controlled police, what opposition remains has been systematically muzzled and terrorized.
The political pattern which has consistently resulted from Soviet military occupation has been repeated with monotonous similarity in North Korea. In December 1945 the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom and the USSR met at Moscow and reached an agreement to set up in Korea a Joint US–USSR Commission to work out the details of the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government in consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations. Meanwhile in August Soviet military occupation had been carried out in North Korea. In accordance with Soviet practice, Moscow-trained Koreans who accompanied the Soviet troops into that area were placed in key positions. As in eastern Germany, this phase was promptly followed by the introduction of a “land reform,” calculated to win the friendship and good will of the peasantry. An intensive “educational” campaign was simultaneously maintained by [Page 828] the Soviet military propaganda machine, extolling the Communist way of life and discrediting the United States occupation and individual political leaders in South Korea. As a result of the efficacy of this campaign, the ironclad censorship of the Soviet-controlled press and radio, and the imminent threat of repressive measures, the average Korean soon had no alternative but to submit to the influence of Communist propaganda and pressure or to flee the area. The Soviet military authorities trained the police in Communist methods and showered them with special privileges. Their number was increased to the point where the country was soon transformed into a “police state,” with a police system modelled upon the notorious MGB. Leaders of the intelligentsia who had not joined the “state party,” the North Korea Labor Party, were either intimidated or arrested. Again the pattern was set for a totalitarian state.
In Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania the methods employed during Soviet military occupation have been approximately the same as in the Baltic states and the Soviet zones of Germany and Korea, and the political consequences have been similar. The Armistice agreements concluded for each of the countries provided for Allied Control Commissions, composed of U.S., British and Soviet representatives, to supervise the execution of the Armistice terms. But as the Commissions were under Soviet chairmen, as only Soviet troops were used as occupation forces, and as Communists secured control of the key positions in the post-war governments, American and British efforts served merely to delay the process of complete Sovietization of the three countries. In general, the implied threat, rather than the use, of the force represented by the Soviet occupation troops was sufficient to obtain compliance with Soviet desires. The establishment of Communist-controlled governments has been possible only where Soviet military forces have been in a position to lend prompt and compelling support to the pressure tactics of local Communist parties.
- The special session of the General Assembly met in New York between April 16 and May 14, 1948.↩