Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

868.00/3–2648: Telegram

Governor Dwight P. Griswold to the Secretary of State

secret

Athens, March 26, 1948—6 p. m.

Amag 536. International developments and especially Czech debacle,¹ President’s speech March 17² and approaching Italian elections have altered considerably psychological factors effecting achievement mission objectives Greece.

Heretofore I have believed that crushing defeat bandits next few months would not only greatly improve actual economic conditions but also stimulate public confidence that Greek economy which is so dependent psychological factors at this time would take definite and permanent upturn. Today this does not appear wholly true. Greeks are increasingly fearful international situation and that US Soviet war may come with Greece a pawn which may be overrun. Reduction bandit menace to police proportions will obviously greatly improve national economic factors, but because of increased fear of international dangers will not create these psychological factors essential to sound economic rehabilitation to extent anticipated earlier. Anti-Communist success Italy and reduction northern pressure would of course greatly improve situation.

Internal military situation in Greece improving. Satisfactory military command setup established, necessary changes personnel progressing and important operations against bandits scheduled which should on military considerations be successful. Meanwhile GNA (Greek National Assembly [Army]) in north has become far more aggressive than in many months and has won important local operations especially Vermion–Pieria–Olympus area. It is noticeable that forcible recruitment by bandits has correspondingly diminished.

However, Department should be aware of following hazards: gold market under severest pressure not as a few months ago for economic causes but apparently because long range fear of war and overrunning of Greece. If gold market gets beyond control and especially if as consequence government falls military operations may be interfered with. Certainly morale of troops which except NDC (Amag 522³) now excellent would drop while bandit morale and offensive, spirit bandits and Fifth Column would increase. A second hazard will arise from necessary concentration of forces to crush bandit groups piece-meal. These concentrations will certainly result in bandit diversionary pressures elsewhere with, quite possibly, temporary successes having serious psychological reactions to Greece. A third hazard is that as interior bandits (by interior mean up to actual frontier zone) seriously threatened by GNA, foreign aid may be increased so that diversionary pressures might develop serious military and political as well as psychological consequences, especially if such diversionary action should succeed in capturing any town sufficiently large for “capital” Markos Junta.

Impossible evaluate here rumors of activities in satellite countries. Logically it would appear most likely that if any overt assistance to be given guerrillas this will be by or via Albania with whom Greece claims technical state of war, who is not member UN and whose border touches Grammos where largest concentration guerrillas located. Would appreciate Department’s thinking as to role AMAG and especially JUSMAPG officers should formal Albanian war develop and invasion by official Albanian forces.

In evaluating effect of international threat as opposed to bandit menace, it must be recognized that aside from the estimated 10 percent of population who desire Communist victory there are many others who are trying avoid taking side in present struggle fearing possible ultimate Communist domination country and desiring be with or at least not to have opposed winning side. I am inclined to doubt that invasion by Soviet or satellite would galvanize country into unity as did Italian invasion of 1940.

Griswold

1. For documentation on the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia during the cabinet crisis of February 1948, see pp. 733 ff.
2. For the text of President Truman’s address before the Congress on the critical nature of the situation in Europe, see Department of State Bulletin, March 28, 1948, p. 418.
3. Dated March 24, p. 63.