860F.00B/1–2848: Telegram
The Chargé in Czechoslovakia ( Bruins ) to the Secretary of State
77. As indicated in recent telegrams from Embassy, Communist drive has begun for 51 percent majority in Czechoslovakia election campaign culminating early in May. Full propaganda advantage being taken of liberation of most of Czechoslovakia by Soviet Army and also of much-needed grain deliveries which are now arriving from east. On other hand, there is great deal of goodwill among Czech people toward western countries including US. I believe 80 percent of Czech people favor western style democracy over Communism but expediency and timidity render most of them inarticulate. Therefore it would be desirable for us to make some sort of gesture which would encourage people to express their true feelings in the secrecy of voting booth. I believe such a gesture should not take form of loan or other monetary handout which would only expose us to charge that we are trying to buy souls of central Europeans with our dollars.
I am convinced there are three things we could do which would materially consolidate this pro-western sentiment and that we should do all of them without delay: (1) negotiate a commercial agreement, (2) negotiate a cultural convention, (3) publish American documents in Czechoslovakia on true story of liberation of Praha.
On first point Czech Foreign Office has been notified of Department’s attitude as stated in first paragraph Deptel 71, January 23.1 While formal Czech counterdraft not required by Department for present, I have asked Clementis2 to obtain reactions of various ministries [Page 734] concerned so that when Ambassador returns there will be concrete basis for negotiations. I asked Ripka3 today whether in his opinion Communists might attempt to sabotage such an agreement at last moment to which he replied in negative, saying that Communists are well aware Czechoslovakia needs increased trade with US. In view of many economic postwar uncertainties in eastern Europe, I believe we are inclined to be over-technical, and that in accordance with short-term treaties which Czechoslovakia has negotiated with about 25 countries in last few months we should keep it as simple as possible which will also expedite negotiation and greatly increase its propaganda value. Because of uncertainties I believe it would be unwise for us to tie ourselves up to any long-term agreement at present.
As to cultural convention, it could follow lines of one transmitted to Department with London despatch 1541, June 27 between UK and Czechoslovakia4 which is very loosely worded. See also Praha telegram 1531 October 9.5 Since we are in any case conducting an informational program and are already exchanging professors and students such a convention would not cost us anything nor commit us to more than we are already doing. It could be played up as first American cultural convention with any European country and would have great value in encouraging our friends in Czechoslovakia. What they need most is moral support. They do not want to feel “deserted”.
Regarding story of liberation of Praha, Deptel 74 January 236 states efforts are being made thru Department of Army to obtain declassification of desired documents. I hope these can be supplied to us in February but March would not be too late. Photostat copies of documents on glossy paper should be furnished so we can reproduce them convincingly in Czech press. Importance of forthcoming Czech elections is difficult to overestimate. Embassy informed by trusted sources close to President7 that if Communists do not gain materially President prepared to insist new Prime Minister be non-Communist.8 He might have done so in 1946 except for imminent fear of revolution [Page 735] which has meanwhile diminished. Therefore, if moderates can make reasonably good showing, present inordinate domination of government by Communists may be corrected.
While it desirable that mentioned negotiations be carried on by Ambassador Steinhardt after he returns to Praha February 20 on basis of his recent discussions in Department, I am very anxious for aforementioned propaganda reasons that preliminary decisions and routine work be completed at earliest possible date so we can proceed with these matters without delay when he returns. I regard above proposals as primarily in our own self-interest and as offering at negligible risk a good hope of success in “containing” Communism on this front.
- In 1947 an American draft of a commercial treaty had been referred to Czechoslovak authorities. Czechoslovak Foreign Office comments on this draft had been communicated to the Embassy in Praha in December 1947. Telegram 71, January 23, 1948, to Praha, not printed, indicated that in view of the CzechoSlovak comments Ambassador Steinhardt, then in Washington on consultation, could begin preliminary discussions on a treaty upon his return to Praha (711.60F2/1–1348).↩
- Vladimir Clementis, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs; member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.↩
- Hubert Ripka, Minister for Foreign Trade; leader in the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party.↩
- The despatch under reference here is not printed; it transmitted a copy of British Cmd. 7155, Czechoslovakia No. 1 (1947), the Cultural Convention between the United Kingdom and Czechoslovakia, effected by an exchange of notes on June 16, 1947.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed. The texts of correspondence between Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force and the Soviet High Command concerning the decisions to halt Allied military forces in Czechoslovakia in May 1945 were eventually released to the press on May 9, 1949. For the texts and an accompanying statement by the Department of State, see Department of State Bulletin, May 22, 1949, pp. 665–667.↩
- Czechoslovak President Eduard Beneš.↩
- The current Czechoslovak Prime Minister was Klement Gottwald, Chairman of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.↩