868.00/3–2248

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Cannon) to the Secretary of State

secret
No. 272

Sir: I have the honor to present an analysis of the Yugoslav Aid Program for the Greek guerrillas as it has developed over the last three months, since the proclamation on December 24, 1947, of a “Provisional Democratic Government of Free Greece” (PDGFG), together with the views of this Embassy concerning the importance of the aid furnished and the significance of the program in determining the present political relationship between the Yugoslav Government and the Markos junta.

Reference is made to this Embassy’s Despatch No. 247, March 12,1 which presented, primarily, an estimate of the military aspects of this aid; the present Despatch is intended more as a review of the political implications of the Yugoslav Aid Program. The Embassy’s study of this Program has persuaded it that the following conclusions are fully justified by such evidence as is now available:

(1)
That the Yugoslav Government is furnishing aid and assistance to the Greek guerrillas at the present time economically, through its [Page 63] Committees of Assistance; diplomatically, by its semi-official attentions to various Markos agents; militarily, through logistical and other support; and in the field of public opinion, by the extension of its propaganda facilities.
(2)
That these acts in the aggregate come close to a de facto recognition of the PDGFG.
(3)
That this aid and assistance amount to a flagrant violation of the General Assembly Resolution of October 21, 1947, which called upon Yugoslavia (and Albania and Bulgaria) “… to do nothing which could furnish aid and assistance to the said guerrillas;” and “… to cooperate in the settlement of their disputes by peaceful means . . . .”
(4)
That both the present volume of this aid and assistance, and the inherent possibilities for their expansion, require international cognizance and remedial action as necessary adjuncts to the military campaign of the Greek Government against the guerrillas and to the overall settlement of the threats against the political independence and the territorial integrity of Greece.

Part I of this Despatch is a review of this Yugoslav Aid Program. Part II is an analysis of the significance of the aid furnished. Part III develops certain conclusions which follow from Parts I and II.

[Here follow Parts I, II, and III.]

Cavendish W. Cannon
  1. Not printed.