840.811/8–948: Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Cannon) to the Secretary of State

secret

Deldu46. In submitting only 11 formal amendments to Soviet draft convention we have been guided largely by tactical considerations. If, as we assume, final document proves unacceptable to US it will have been preferable to concentrate attention on major issues dividing east and west blocs without distracting attention on minor points. We further [Page 675] felt that bargaining position on major issues would be stronger if Soviets were not given opportunity to make concessions on details.

Today’s session gave no indication of course or tone of committee discussions but we should be in good position to estimate after tomorrow’s session. Important issues will be joined in discussions on French and US amendments to preamble, US amendment to Article 1, and British amendment to Article 2. We shall have to formulate our tactics on subsequent articles including question of abstentions in votes on articles which we can accept in principle after these discussions which will reveal whether Soviet controlled bloc intends adopt forcing or conciliatory position.

British and French approaching committee discussions with considerable reserve. We continue to favor full consideration entire Soviet draft, building up strongest possible position for eventual rejection unacceptable convention. Presumably as result Department’s intervention French delegation has apparently received instructions to conform more closely to US intention of seeing conference through to end.1 We have received impression that French instructions on this point are rigid. Meanwhile we have perforce become more flexible.

Because of rapid shifts in conference atmosphere and unpredictable Soviet tactics from day to day it would appear desirable that French delegation be given greater freedom of action in order to be able to adapt itself to any situation which may arise. In meeting maneuvers Vyshinsky who seems to be working on broad instructions western delegations are at great disadvantage if they must obtain advance authorization for every change in position.

Sent Department; repeated London 156, Paris 146.

Cannon
  1. After communication with the British Foreign Office and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Department of State was able to inform the Embassy in Yugoslavia by telegram 472, Dudel 32, on August 10, 1948, 6 p. m.: “British Embassy has informed Department that British Fonoff concurs in procedure outlined [in] your 1050 Aug. 4 and Deldu 39 Aug. 6. We understand British and French now agree western powers should not withdraw prior [to] final vote on basic issues”. The Department further expressed its approval of Cannon’s intended procedure as outlined in his telegram Deldu 39 of August 6. (840.811/8–1048) See also telegram 483, Dudel 39, to the Embassy in Yugoslavia on August 12, p. 685.