840.811/8–448: Telegram
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Cannon) to the Secretary of State
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1050. Deptel 447, August 3. Herewith my comments both as delegate and as Ambassador from standpoint Embassy and our future east European political relations.
We are all agreed our larger strategy in current and prospective east west negotiations must control our tactics there and that they in turn will help to shape Soviet appraisal our ability carry through our statements of policy in other areas. It is for these reasons I prefer give impression here of willingness to negotiate with patience, firmness and fairness and with as much consideration for rights and views smaller powers as can be summoned.
Delegation believes there is no present intention Soviets to terminate or force termination conference immediately. As soon however as I take stand of insistence on western representation and resolution disputes by UN body conference will to all intents and purposes be over. Discussion will immediately shift from substantive clauses Soviet draft to attack on US position and will continue until we permit our proposals to be brought to vote and/or leave conference. Soviet delegation and satellites are already so strongly committed to exclusively riparian commission that no compromise on this issue is likely. On opening day, Vyshinsky made clear that convention would be concluded even if minority opposed. If western powers should leave conference I am convinced remaining delegations would continue business promptly accept Soviet proposals.
Tonight British strongly urged that our draft convention which I showed them Monday be tabled to, provide alternative basis for discussion [Page 654] and to derive publicity value from detailed statement western position. I have been reluctant to table draft both because of Dept position that USDel should not at this particular conference take lead in opposing Soviets and for practical considerations. In view Dept feeling that draft should be tabled, however, I have decided to place it before conference tomorrow having understanding with Peake that British will expand their statement of principles into something approaching a working draft and will table it when their turn comes to speak.
Our draft has been revised and tightened up. Full text will follow.
At tomorrow’s session I will make general US positional statement (text follows1) in which I summarize constructive ideas embodied in our draft and criticize Soviet text. I shall also discuss political themes demonstrably relevant to subject and to debate thus far. This statement, together publication US draft should assist US and world press understand nature issues involved.
After all delegations have made general statements (probably Thursday or Friday2) I feel it preferable if we can devote some days either in plenary or committee in support our position and in demonstrating inequities in Soviet draft. It is only at end this discussion that I recommend insistence on non-riparian membership and disputes issues. My stand on these points together with guarantees for rights of small powers represented and not represented at conference and exposure of Soviet imperialism must climax our debate.
We have carefully considered within delegation relative merits of forcing break in conference on issue of our choosing or of sitting it out to end. On balance I am certain we should adopt latter course and avoid withdrawal. Vyshinsky tactics in opening sessions were clearly directed towards inducing western delegations to leave conference, thereby permitting Soviet propaganda to exploit alleged unwillingness western powers to negotiate question on merits and leaving Soviet-controlled conference free to adopt pre-agreed convention. Our withdrawal at any stage in my opinion plays into Soviet hands and I feel we should resolve to see conference through and debate each issue as it arises. I propose to follow this course unless Dept directs otherwise.
French and British delegations not so staunchly determined to see conference through and their attitude may require occasional strengthening. We shall endeavor to persuade French and British not to withdraw at any stage. If Dept concurs I suggest it seek to strengthen resolution French and British Govts in this respect. I doubt that British or French will withdraw without assurance that we will follow [Page 655] but would appreciate Dept’s views re course I should follow if faced with such development.
If we remain to end of conference I propose to force vote on each controversial issue in convention arid in final session to declare inability US Govt to sign act which in our view completely fails implement CFM resolution and treaty provisions. I will utilize final session for strongest possible attack on Soviet railroading tactics at conference and imperialistic Soviet policy in Danube nations.