Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

840.811/7–348: Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Cannon) to the Secretary of State

secret   us urgent

Belgrade, Undated.¹
[Received July 3 [31], 1948—9:43 p. m.]

Unnumbered. Deldu 18.² Opening session Danubian Conference held 5 p. m. yesterday,³ Simic presiding. Procedural decisions were taken to hold one meeting daily and to rotate chairmanship daily in Russian alphabetical order. Mates of Yugoslav Foreign Office chosen Secretary General.⁴

There were clear indications that Soviets intend use their majority to direct conference the way they want it to go, taking every opportunity to stress their thesis that Danube is direct concern of riparian states and of little or no concern to outsiders. Vyshinsky, reverting to the usual domineering manner of Communists who find themselves in control and obviously relishing his position, took the lead, crying on one occasion that conference had met to establish a regime in interest of riparian states, and that it would do so regardless of possible objections of small minority of states represented at conference. However, at another point he remarked with a smirk that USSR had had long experience of being in minority at international Conferences, understood the difficulties of that position, and therefore did not intend to take unfair advantage of it.⁵

Simic in opening address of welcome stated that People’s democracies with USSR at their head, in their capacity as riparian states on the longest and most important sector of Danube, would be surest guarantors that Danube would serve as peaceful highway for exchange of goods among all peoples sincerely desirous of peace, in the spirit of Danube clauses of peace treaties. Bebler,⁶ heading Yugoslav delegation, emphasized distance between Danube area and US, even questioning by inference right of US and UK to be present at conference.⁷

Only major argument which centered on conference languages revealed Soviet intention to limit Danube control to riparians and eliminate Anglo-American interest in river. Vyshinsky proposed Russian and French as official languages (for documents) which would preclude English text in any convention concluded. I objected strongly and Peake, who did not immediately grasp significance this maneuver, gave rather perfunctory support. Vyshinsky then made gesture of admitting English as working language (for debates). Peake and I pressed strongly for recognition as official language as well. In long argument Vyshinksy cited Versailles Conference, Danube Conference of 1921, UN procedure and other irrelevant examples, also arguing necessity on practical grounds of limiting official languages to two. Satellites in stuttering Russian obediently announced support of Soviet proposal.

In statement of US position I made following points:⁸

(1) We had not expected such a determined effort, so richly and speciously documented, to exclude English as official language, as this was a simple procedural matter which should logically have been settled automatically in accordance with practice at other conferences held since recent war.

(2) Precedents cited by Vyshinsky were not analogous to present conference. Closest parallel was in fact Paris Conference of 1946 when all three were official and working languages.

(3) Danube Conference had been called following decision of, and at suggestion of, four CFM Powers, two of which were English speaking.

(4) US Delegation hoped that other delegations would remember that eyes of world are on this conference, and that apparent predetermined effort to push through such decision as this would make unfortunate impression.

(5) Heed must be paid to problems of practical operations of conference. Failure to issue documents in English would increase burden on English-speaking delegations, and US Delegation should not be placed in position of having to submit to its Government final documents of which no authentic English text existed.

(6) US Delegation felt that the important thing now was to get on with work of conference in spirit of cooperation, and that introduction of language issue in this way was jeopardizing this possibility.

When vote taken, proposal for three working languages was unanimously accepted. Soviets proposal for two official languages was adopted by 7 to 3 majority. French supported our position but only in brief statement that language of two of four sponsoring powers should not be excluded as official language.

Background of language dispute will probably be of interest to Washington correspondents. On July 4 Yugoslav Foreign Office official orally informed Embassy while discussing conference arrangements that French, English and Russian would be official languages (Embtel 840, July 5).⁹ US Delegation constituted on basis this assurance and arrangement adopted yesterday will place heavy burden on our translating personnel. This morning Bebler before seeing Vyshinsky told French Ambassador there would be three official languages. Last evening, however, first secretariat document was circulated only in French and Russian, and we protested immediately. Proposed rules for procedure circulated immediately after close yesterday’s session contained arrangement adopted yesterday, clearly indicating advance agreement with satellites on this point.

From day’s deliberations it seems to me quite apparent that Soviets intend use their majority freely, make position of western powers as difficult as possible, push through their own proposals as rapidly as they can, and use conference as propaganda forum for own aims in eastern Europe. Yesterday morning I was told confidentially by Bebler that Soviets had own draft convention ready. Probably they will submit it at an early date, have it taken as basis for discussion, and seek summary disposal of amendments and proposals of western powers. Almost certainly their draft will provide for a regime in which only riparian states will participate.

In view of slight possibility of agreement on a convention, or even of serious discussion on major points of our draft, I think it likely that conference will become scene of exchange of strong statements between east and west with USSR and US as chief protagonists. Since we must now face possibility that conference may come to breaking point fairly soon, we have in preparation for today’s session US position on major substantive points of Danube question, in order that we may be in most advantageous position to explain to American and world opinion what has happened at conference and reasons for its failure.

Reference Department’s Dudel 2, July 29,¹⁰ would appreciate immediately by cable any additional documented data regarding Soviet economic domination of Danubian states. In view of turn conference taking opportunity may arise to put case fully on record under setup where we can lose nothing process.

Department pass to Moscow, Bucharest, Sofia, Budapest, Praha, Vienna, Paris, London, Geneva, Berlin.

Cannon

1. In telegrams received in this series, occasional changes in punctuation and words have been made in accordance with the original text as sent from Belgrade.
2. In telegram Deldu 26 from Belgrade on August 2, 1948, 3 p. m., Ambassador Cannon explained that this message was “delayed in transmission and was forwarded as Deldu 18.”
3. Friday, July 30, 1948.
4. Leo Mattes (Mates), Chief of section for International Organizations in the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
5. Vyshinsky declared: “The convention adopted here will not have to be referred to any one. It will be adopted by the majority of the conference and signed by those who wish to sign and will come into force without the consent of a small minority if there be such a minority. … Too often we have found ourselves in international bodies being suppressed. We do not wish to do the same to you but we wish you to be guided by practical considerations.”
6. Dr. Alesh (Aljes) Bebler, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia.
7. The opening statement by the Chairman of the United States Delegation, Ambassador Cavendish W. Cannon, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 15, 1948, pp. 197–199.
8. For the press release of August 2, on the adoption of French and Russian as the official languages of the Danube Conference, see Department of State Bulletin, August 15, 1948, p. 200.
9. Not printed.
10. Not printed; but see footnote 3, p. 632.