Office of the Historian

646C.6131/11–1048: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

secret
Washington, November 10, 1948—4 p. m.

1308. Would appreciate reasons why Emb believes rubber the critical lever holding open manganese chrome supply line. (Embtel 2583, [Page 581] Nov 71) Although Dept recognizes importance rubber USSR and manganese US, Sov bureaucracy and US-Sov economic relations possibly too complex permit isolation uniquely important factor or suggest likelihood Sov pairing specific commodities.

Basis urtel USSR should not be permitted obtain rubber at will but stopping rubber shipments might precipitate Sov stopping manganese chrome. Dept would appreciate your suggestions feasible program between these extremes.

Dept believes peacetime preclusive rubber buying probably impracticable because ease shipping satellites or smuggling enough rubber meet minimum Sov needs representing small fraction world production. Also raises problems (1) instituting all-out economic warfare action involving cooperation non-ERP countries, (2) involving other commodities through self-invited Sov offers as lever gain profitable US contacts, (3) difficulty enforcement through worldwide export controls, and (4) existence UK and Neth trade agreements.

Lovett

  1. The telegram under reference, not printed, reported on Soviet rubber production and stockpiling and concluded with the following observation:

    “Finally, in our view with any reasonable chance that Soviets through bold 1948 acquisitions tripling 1947 purchases natural [rubber] have secured three-four year stock minimum needs—West may have sacrificed not only important control and check on Soviet military potential but possibly also the critical lever now acting to hold open USSR-US manganese chrome supply line.” (861.6176/11–748)

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