As indicated in Enclosure A, the Governments of the United Kingdom and
the United States have agreed to make approaches to the governments of
certain third countries and to transmit to their respective missions
similar instructions with respect to the manner in which such approaches
should be made. An additional enclosure (Enclosure C)3 lists the missions to which
these instructions are being transmitted by the respective Governments
either for action or information. All United States missions to which
these instructions are being transmitted herewith for action have
previously been provided with a copy of NSC 15/1; some of the United States missions to which these
instructions are being transmitted for information have also received
this NSC document. For the information
of those missions which have not received the circular instruction dated
July 21, 1948 an extract of NSC 15/1,
containing the “Recommendations” therein stated, is enclosed as
Enclosure D.3 Since the
background memorandum (Enclosure B) adequately reflects all other
important information contained in NSC
15/1 copies of the full NSC document
will not be more widely distributed, for the time being at least.
It will be observed that the course of action agreed to by the British
and the United States Governments is identical with the recommendations
contained in NSC 15/1 so far as the
prevention of the sale of aviation equipment and the denial of the use
of overhaul and maintenance facilities to Soviet and Satellite aircraft
are concerned. It will
[Page 482]
be
noted, however, that the recommendations of the United States Government
with respect to the containment of Soviet and Satellite air transport
operations have not been accepted in their entirety by the British. The
Department has made it clear to the British Government that the United
States continues to believe that the containment measures called for in
NSC 15/1 should be fully undertaken
but has agreed to follow the modified course of action advocated by the
British Government (Paragraph 7(a) Enclosure B)
with the understanding that further discussions will be held between the
two Governments with respect to this point.
In view of the fact that there is some overlapping between the aspect of
our aviation policy which pertains to the prohibition of sales of
aviation equipment to Soviet and Satellite States and State-ECA policy concerning the limitation of
certain exports to Eastern European states from countries members of the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation, officers receiving this
instruction for action should closely coordinate with ECA missions, wherever appropriate, their
approaches to the governments to which they are accredited.
United States missions receiving this instruction for action are
requested to advise the Department promptly by cable of the receipt
thereof, and similarly to report the results of action subsequently
taken. Officers to which this instruction is being transmitted for
information only are requested to advise the Department promptly if, in
their opinion, any aspect of the course of action outlined in Enclosure
A is applicable to any of the countries to which they are
accredited.
[Enclosure B]
Memorandum Prepared by American and British
Officers5
secret
[London, December 6, 1948.]
United Kingdom/United States Civil Aviation
Policy Towards the Soviet Union and Its Satellites
The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States have
recently reviewed in consultation their policy towards the Soviet
Union and its satellite States in matters relating to civil
aviation. For this purpose the following have been regarded as
satellite States: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Northern Korea, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Roumania and Yugoslovia.
2. During these consultations the United States Government put
forward certain proposals for a joint policy. Although some features
of these proposals have been deferred for further discussion, a wide
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measure of agreement
was reached between the two Governments. The following paragraphs of
this Memorandum contain their analysis of the present position and
their conclusions as to the course of action which should be
adopted.
3. Some of the satellite countries, especially Czechoslovakia, have
previously sought and made agreements for the exchange of air
services on a reciprocal basis with countries outside Eastern
Europe. While they remained comparatively free from Soviet control
their air lines could be regarded as independent national
enterprises; in conceding such air lines the right to fly from
points in their national territories to points outside Eastern
Europe in exchange for the right of other air lines to fly to points
within these countries, it was possible to reach agreement with them
on a basis of genuine reciprocity. The air lines of these satellite
countries are, however, no longer independent but enterprises under
Soviet domination; the Soviet authorities have acquired part of the
share capital in them and a predominant voice in their management,
and there is even reason to believe that in many cases the crews of
satellite aircraft include Russian personnel. These air lines must
therefore be treated for all intents and purposes in the same way as
Soviet enterprises. In these circumstances there can clearly be no
true reciprocity in allowing such an air line to fly to capital
cities and points of comparable importance outside satellite
territories in exchange for the right to fly not to a point within
the Soviet Union itself, but merely to points on the periphery of
the Soviet-controlled areas.
4. The two Governments have been particularly concerned with the
consequences of the change in status of such air lines since
Czechoslovakia entered the Soviet orbit, because this country had
built up an efficient system of air services which it has continued
since its absorption to endeavour to expand.
5. The two Governments have been keeping close watch on attempts by
the Soviet Government to extend their influence by the establishment
or expansion in certain areas of the world of semi-government Soviet
agencies which, under the cover of official or commercial functions,
carry on subversive propaganda and espionage. The establishment of
Soviet or Soviet controlled services to these areas, apart from
being in itself a means for the exertion of this influence, renders
the working of such agencies more effective by providing rapid and
easy communication between them and the Soviet Union. One of the
areas to which particular attention has been paid in this respect is
the Middle East.
6. Another feature which gives rise to some concern is the fact that
the operation of satellite air services to countries outside Eastern
Europe would in present circumstances afford facilities to members
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of Soviet aircrews and
to satellite nationals for gaining experience in flying over
territory containing important strategic objectives.
7. The United Kingdom and the United States Governments have
accordingly agreed to adopt the following course of action
themselves and hope to persuade other countries to cooperate with
them in putting it into effect:
- (a)
- not to grant permission for satellite services to their
territory beyond what is absolutely necessary as a quid pro quo to obtain such services
as they require and are actually ready to operate into
satellite territory;
- (b)
- to deny all but the minimum facilities necessary for the
operation of these satellite air services and for securing
adequate facilities for their own services;
- (c)
- to prevent (as the United Kingdom and the United States
are already doing) the export directly or indirectly of
aircraft and associated equipment from their countries to
Soviet and satellite agencies;
- (d)
- to prevent the use by Soviet and satellite aircraft of
facilities in their territory for overhaul, refitting or
major maintenance.
This policy should apply not only to scheduled, but also to
non-scheduled charter and special flights, which the satellite air
lines are likely to try to make whenever it appears to them easier
to obtain in this way the rights they require.
8. It may be useful by way of illustration to explain what is already
being done by the two Governments towards carrying into effect the
course of action described in subparagraph (a) of the preceding paragraph. The United Kingdom Government
operate a valuable military courier service to Warsaw and would be
unwilling to jeopardize it by refusing corresponding facilities for
a Polish service to London if the Polish authorities ever wished to
operate one. However, they broke off negotiations for a civil
aviation agreement with Yugoslavia because economic circumstances
forced them to abandon the idea of operating an air service to the
Balkan capitals, and they would refuse to discuss proposals for
Yugoslav, Hungarian, Roumanian or Bulgarian air services to United
Kingdom so long as they do not wish themselves to operate to these
countries.
9. The United Kingdom Government feel it useful to have a British
European Airways service to Prague, and are therefore obliged to
allow a Czechoslovakian air service to London. The United Kingdom
Government have however, been as little forthcoming as possible in
their civil aviation dealings with Czechoslovakia since the coup d’état. Thus, they have decided to hold
up their ratification of an Anglo-Czechoslovak Civil Aviation
Agreement, which was signed before the coup
d’état and has since been ratified by the Czechoslovak
Government.
[Page 487]
10. The United States Government concluded a bilateral civil aviation
agreement with Czechoslovakia in January, 1946 and under the terms
of this agreement Pan American Airways is operating a service to
Prague. The Czechoslovakian Government has not requested operating
permits for a reciprocal service to the United States and, under
present conditions, it is not likely that such an operating permit
would be granted if requested.
11. A further factor in civil aviation relations with Czechoslovakia
is that the Czechoslovak Government is a party to the Chicago Air
Services Transit Agreement which relates only to scheduled services.
In view of this it is sometimes difficult for parties to this
Agreement to deny transit rights, with or without landings, as
distinct from traffic stops, for Czechoslovak air services, at any
rate on reasonably direct routes through their territories. In
certain circumstances, however, it would be possible for the
Government concerned to refuse transit rights, for example:
- (i)
- where it was not satisfied that Czechoslovakia was already
entitled to operate a scheduled service with commercial
rights at a point beyond the territory concerned;
- (ii)
- where the proposed transit or landing was not
operationally necessary for such a scheduled service;
- (iii)
- where Article 4 of the Chicago Convention or Article I (5)
of the Chicago Air Services Transit Agreement could be
invoked.
Article 4 of the Convention which governs the Transit Agreement reads
as follows:
“Each contracting State agrees not to use civil aviation for
any purpose inconsistent with the aims of this
Convention.”
Article I (5) of the Transit Agreement reads as follows:
“Each contracting State reserves the right to withhold or
revoke a certificate or permit to an air transport
enterprise of another State in any case where it is not
satisfied that substantial ownership and effective control
are vested in nationals of a contracting State, or in case
of failure of such air transport enterprise to comply with
the laws of the State over which it operates, or to perform
its obligations under this Agreement.”
It is to be noted in this connection that the United Kingdom
Government withheld permission for a Czechoslovak air service to
begin operations through Palestine on a route to Baghdad and Tehran
(although this route figured in the Annex to the United
Kingdom/Czechoslovak Air Agreement), and they are delaying
indefinitely consideration of a Czechoslovak request for transit
rights at Bahrein and Sharjah on a proposed service to Pakistan and
India. These special considerations, however, need not be taken into
account in the case of the other satellites.
[Page 488]
12. With regard to sub-paragraph (b) of
paragraph 7 the minimum facilities which the two Governments have in
mind would be the provision of fuel and temporary and minor
servicing arrangements sufficient to enable the satellite aircraft
to make the return journey to its country from the airport
concerned.
13. With regard to restrictions proposed in sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 7 the two Governments have
found that export controls reinforced by good relations between
themselves and manufacturers and exporters of aircraft and aircraft
equipment in their countries have made it possible effectively to
prevent the sale and export of aircraft and spare parts directly to
Soviet or satellite agencies, but there is always the possibility
that equipment sold to a purchaser may subsequently find its way by
resale and re-export into the hands of Soviet or satellite agencies.
Warranties that this shall not happen may be extracted from the
purchaser, but it is inherent in the transaction that such
warranties will rarely be enforceable in the courts of the vendor’s
country. The conclusion is that no country can by itself exclude the
possibility of new or second-hand equipment exported by its
nationals reaching countries to which it desires to deny them. To
the extent however that agreement is reached among the Governments
concerned that each of them will take steps to prevent the export or
re-export of equipment to the Soviet Union and satellite countries,
the individual national restrictions imposed in pursuance of this
common policy will Supplement each other and combine to produce an
effective measure of containment.
14. It does not seem feasible to draw up a comprehensive list of the
types of equipment which might for this purpose be denied to the
Soviet Union and satellite countries. Such a list would almost
certainly, in practice prove incomplete, and there would always be
borderline cases on which one Government might desire to consult
another. The two Governments have, however, in mind that, broadly
speaking, not only aircraft frames and engines and spare parts for
these should be subject to the policy, but also all accessories
necessary to the operation of aircraft, including navigational aids
and aerodrome equipment generally.
15. The two Governments believe that it would be desirable for
themselves and other Governments who agree to cooperate with them in
the course of action set out in this memorandum to keep each other
informed of developments which affect its realization and to consult
with each other whenever necessary.
