711.4027/11–1148: Telegram
The Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)
5831. I have just seen Deptel 4315 of November 5 to Paris1 and would question meaning of paragraph (B) 1. Does Department mean that even though we and British are in full agreement regarding desirability preventing satellite aviation penetration in Middle and Far East, we would refuse to approach countries in that area on a common front basis with British just because British have stated their unwillingness to join with us in endeavoring halt existing satellite services to Western Europe? I had understood that our aviation policy was motivated in very large part by security considerations. If this be so, is it wise to throw away the possibility of improving our security position in such vital areas as Middle and Far East just because British won’t join with us in efforts to eliminate satellite air services in Western Europe?
Urtel 4048 October 162 to me suggested we should take British up on blocking satellites in East and leave question of Western Europe in abeyance. Can you tell me what accounts for apparently different view in Deptel 4315? Is it Department’s fear that agreement on common front action in Middle and Far East may be interpreted as acceptance by US of British position regarding Western Europe transport question? I am informed by Railey, who was in London, that it was made amply clear and even repeated emphatically on several occasions in discussions with British that we were not retreating from our position but were merely not pressing point for time [Page 480] being. It is difficult to see how we jeopardize our position, therefore, by agreeing to a memorandum which is being sent only to our respective missions, especially since memo itself states that some features of proposals have been deferred for further discussions.
Sent, Department 5831, repeated London 1233, Bern 883.