711.4027/10–3048: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
4214. Dept has following comments re procedure suggested ur 4687 and 4688 Oct 301 for implementing with Brit support certain aspects NSC 15/1:2
(A) 1. US policy (NSC 15/1) calls for (a) containment Soviet and Satellite air transport operations, and (b) prohibition sales aviation equipment and denial use maintenance facilities to Soviet and Satellites, both on common front basis.
2. Brit, Dept understood, agreed with US policy as to (b), but, as to (a), only so far as Middle and Far East were concerned.
3. Dept then proposed (Deptel 4030 Oct 21) move ahead far as possible on agreed points, reserving others for further discussion.
4. Memo quoted Embs 4687, however, has effect placing US position accepting Brit policy, does not leave unsettled points in abeyance and would appear be inconsistent with US–UK mutual understanding that portion of policy on which disagreement still exists should not be discussed other countries until UK and US views reconciled. Even though memo intended as “background” and would be supplemented by “instructions”, virtually complete UK–US agreement is, in Depts opinion, indicated.
(B) 1. Re (A)2 above, Depts 4030 Oct 21 may not have made sufficiently clear that in taking Brit up on their apparent willingness support further US efforts persuade Middle and Far East countries block Soviet and Satellite flights, Dept saw no possibility approaching such countries, either alone or with Brit backing, on anything resembling common front basis so long as Brit views re Satellite flights Western Europe persisted. Dept expected FonOff and Emb would explore possibilities approach which would take this factor into account. Quoted memo which FonOff aparently favors would appear be designed for common front approach, and, as indicated (A) above is geared to Brit views.
2. Dept inclined believe only presently feasible approach to countries concerned to block Soviet and Satellite air operations to Middle [Page 476] and Far East (US particularly anxious, of course, block OSA flights to Greece and Turkey) is along line that Greeks, Turks, etc. should take such action in their own best interests because they have everything to lose and nothing to gain in permitting continuance such flights. Such approach would be weaker, of course, than common front approach called for in NSC 15/1 but in Depts opinion it could, and perhaps should be utilized.
3. Re sale of equipment and facilities aspect, ECA now advises Dept negotiations with seven of sixteen ECA countries already initiated and remaining nine scheduled within next several weeks with whole job expected be completed end Nov. Dept wonders therefore whether, insofar as ECA countries are concerned, East-West trade talks should not effectively take care blocking sales aircraft and components.3 Therefore if Emb and FonOff agree, Dept suggests this aspect problem be narrowed to preparation by Emb and FonOff of draft parallel instructions to respective missions in (a) non-ECA supplier countries and (b) countries with maintenance and overhaul facilities. To extent practicable and desirable believe such draft instructions should incorporate portions of paras 3 through 6 quoted memo ur 4687 in order preserve expression Brit willingness acknowledge existence and seriousness dangers Soviet and Satellite aims.
Dept will appreciate Emb report of Brit reaction to foregoing views.4
- Telegram 4688, October 30, from London, supra. Telegram 4687, October 30, from London, is not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 473.↩
- Ante, p. 451.↩
- For documentation regarding United States policy with respect to trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern European Satellites and the negotiations with the ECA countries under reference here, see pp. 489 ff.↩
- This telegram was repeated to Paris as 4315 and to Bern as 1509.↩