Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

864.00/5–2148: Telegram

The Minister in Hungary (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

secret

Budapest, May 21, 1948—8 p. m.

829. Despite Truman Marshall statements regarding Smith-Molo-tov exchange¹ and lapse of time marked by seeming diplomatic in action, optimism persists among political minded non-Communist Hungarians concerning probable impact on Hungary of anticipated international developments (see mytels 797 May 12 and 805 May 14).² Though it would appear imprudent not to recognize contribution of wishful thinking combined with psychological need for self-deception in dramatic shift in current political expectation nevertheless hard core of reasoning which constitutes basis for renewed and active hope deserves special attention if for no other reason than that Hungarians living at crossroads of east and west have developed greater sensitivity to and understanding of working of Byzantine mind.

Reasoning indicated above appears built on number basic assumptions:

(1) Time is now unquestionably working for west. Soviet power, influence and prestige have reached a high water mark and since Italian elections have begun to ebb, solid substance being poured into frame western Europe. Tortured and disorganized western Europe which following economic consolidation and military rehabilitation foreshadowed by ERP could prove strong enough unaided to repel Soviet aggression, lacks only necessary self-assurance and faith in righteousness of its historic mission. Necessary self-confidence is being restored gradually by enlightened economic self-interest of America and the prodigious feats of industrial economic and military organization currently in process of achievement by US.

(2) Soviet is now unprepared psychologically, economically or militarily for war.

(3) In face of growing pressure asserted since Czech coup by free world under US leadership Soviets now appear to be faced with three possible courses of action:

(a) Wage a preventive war before west is adequately prepared

(b) Hold tight under mounting pressures which would sooner or later ultimately lead to war

(c) Attempt a settlement.

With respect to (a) it sufficient remark that Soviets are unprepared. Possibility (b) on other hand seems too risky since it involves for Soviets strong probability of decisive defeat and loss of everything.

(4) If assumptions are valid that time now working for west and Soviets unprepared for war then manifestly Kremlin must seek settlement. Soviets therefore deliberately chose present juncture for negotiations looking towards settlement since myth Soviet invincibility—so meticulously and indefatigably propagated not only by Soviet propaganda but contributed to for a while also by a confused and misguided west—now in danger of gradual evaporation; and general recognition by great masses of essential Soviet weakness and compelling western strength would certainly undermine bargaining position of Soviets. In other words, Kremlin has indicated willingness to negotiate European settlement now in hope yielding only that which she must yield in any case (Austria, General Markos, opposition to Marshall Plan and concessions in Germany)³ and of retaining as much as possible of empire erected in eastern Europe.

(5) In such negotiations US probably would compromise holding out for Hungary and Czechoslovakia (special reference of President to these countries in March 17 speech to joint session of Congress)⁴ and Russia would certainly accept since a year from now when myth of Soviet as wave of future exploded Soviets could not hope to obtain comparable terms.

While this Hungarian reasoning may appear unduly optimtic, it may not seem altogether unreasonable if we exercise long-term imagination, ponder history of traditional Russian foreign policy with tactic of two steps forward one backward and pay due regard to fundamental Soviet weakness and remarkable elasticity of Soviet tactics. I now inclined believe there is possible basis for hope that Hungary need not be written off completely as yet and that at some point in future either as result of successful diplomatic negotiations or due to magnetic power of rehabilitated western Europe, democratic processes may be restored in Hungary. I say this mindful of probability, if not certainty, that local Communists will pursue further program of consolidation, perhaps in yet another determined effort to subdue the undecided and disenchanted and coerce obedience and adoration, if only to effect maximum major ideological and structural changes which could not easily be undone and which may be designed to cause optimum hardship and embarrassment to subsequent administrations.

In light above, validity which Department is in better position evaluate, it seems to me there may be some merit in thinking in terms of limited objectives by combining in our relations with Hungary policy of increased firmness with efforts slow down and minimize Communist consolidation. For the present such program may, I believe, conveniently be formulated to four points:

(1) By non-aggressive formally, friendly and cordial relations of Legation with Hungarian Government to slow down consolidation and prevent elimination institutions and growth which may at some point to future be capable of reviewing [reviving] democratic processes in Hungary.

(2) Utilization unrestituted property in Germany—for whose acquisition we have good reason to believe current Hungarian regime willing to make considerable concessions—as bargaining weapon to achieve slow-down in pace of consolidation (mytel 816 May 18).⁵

(3) Within framework of comprehensive program to satellite countries to set up powerful transmitters in Austria and Germany under army auspices to beam alert and aggressive long language programs to Hungary (as well as target language programs to other Soviet satellites). I recommend that these stations, staffed with competent personnel, broadcast as a “voice to displaced persons” and that they monitor radio Budapest newscasts (and those of other satellites) daily identifying, indicating source and correcting distortions. If instituted such broadcasts could in addition to reaching optimum audiences forcefully indicate increased pressure (explanation could always be advanced that these programs prepared for displaced persons) and offer encouragement to overwhelming majority of population which regards current regime as unacceptable since it meets none of requirements of established principles of legitimacy.

(4) So to plan democratic development of Austria as to establish useful precedents (request by one or another Austrian party for UN supervised election, followed by arrival of UN Commission to observe election preparations, voting, etc.) on basis of which east European countries could under more favorable conditions, redress disproportionate influence and power of minority groups.

Repeated London 62, Paris 102, Berlin 59, Vienna 7. Department pass Moscow 85.

Chapin

1. For the exchange between the American Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Walter Bedell Smith, and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Mihailovich Molotov in May 1948 on American policies and purposes regarding the Soviet Union, and the statements by President Truman and Secretary of State Marshall on this exchange, see Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1948, pp. 679–686; for additional documentation on this topic, see pp. 845–857, passim.
2. Neither printed; they reported that as a result of the defeat of the Communists in the Italian elections and the Smith-Molotov exchange, Hungarians appear to be much more optimistic that substantial changes might occur in Hungarian political life without recourse to armed conflict The Hungarians appeared to feel that recent Western successes were limiting Soviet power and prestige in Europe and that the Soviet tide was beginning to recede (864.00/5–1348 and 864.00/5–1448).
3. For documentation regarding the occupation and control of Austria, see vol. ii, pp. 1411 ff; Markos was the head of the so-called Greek Liberation Army and the so-called Provisional Democratic Government of Free Greece; for documentation regarding the efforts of the United States in assisting the Greek Government to suppress the Communist-led Greek guerrilla movement, see pp. 222 ff. For additional documentation regarding the European Recovery Program, see ante, pp. 1 ff. Documentation on Germany is included in volume ii .
4. For the text of the President’s address to Congress on securing the peace and preventing war, see Department of State Bulletin, March 28, 1948, p. 418.
5. Not printed.