501.BB Balkan/3–1248: Telegram
The Secretary of State to Admiral Alan G. Kirk, at Salonika
65. Balcom 118 for Kirk. Following prompted by excellent summary UNSCOB accomplishments set forth Combal 96.1
We are encouraged that UNSCOB now oriented on fundamentally realistic basis. We feel UNSCOB now organizationally prepared advance on two fronts: (a) develop real bases of conciliation (b) report factual realities of situation.
During next six or eight months either Grks will crush backbone guerrilla resistance forcing northern neighbors abandon Markos and possibly accommodate themselves to UNSCOB and Grk Govt or, failing this, economic deterioration in Greece will be accelerated and northern neighbors encouraged to increase assistance to Markos.
We have noted Belgrade’s 31 Mar 5 to BalCom2 and estimate US MA Belgrade (MA tel 50 Feb 24) that offensive launched southeast from Albania quite possible about mid-March or later. In event greatly increased aid to guerrillas whole question adequacy our endeavors through UN and otherwise to save Greece must be examined. In proportion to personnel and expense involved and as evidence our confidence in UN we believe UNSCOB potentially our most effective weapon in protecting Greece. If increased foreign assistance is extended to guerrillas we intend it shall be in full light of UN observation so that nature fighting in northern Greece cannot be misinterpreted or misrepresented. We would appreciate your comment regarding some of ideas set forth below which we are considering for enhancing UNSCOB authority.
[Here follow sections concerning personnel of the United States Delegation, the operation of the observer teams, conciliatory proposals, publicity and preparation of the UNSCOB report.]