868.20/12–2148: Telegram
The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State
2588. While statement of basis US military aid to Greece in Gama 1341, December 6 (not seen by Ambassador prior to departure for [Page 219] US) seems unexceptional as far as it goes, I feel impelled to emphasize extreme danger of insufficient allowance for psychological or morale factors when appropriations again discussed in Congress.
It seems only common prudence to base ourselves on following assumptions, however, unlikely certain of them may appear at present:
- 1.
- Like other peripheral countries Greece would be lost in event of major military attack against it by Russia and satellites.
- 2.
- Loss of Greece to Communism in peace time (that is, in absence major military attack) could be expected start chain reaction in which Turkey, Italy, et cetera might come to terms with Russia.
- 3.
- Without disparaging accomplishments of UN agencies or suggesting that efforts through such channel should not be further pressed in every possible way, UN as such cannot yet be counted on to provide endangered member such as Greece with most elementary protection from aggression envisaged by Charter.
- 4.
- Assurance of continued and adequate military and economic support from US is only remaining factor capable of supporting Greek morale and offsetting fear of Slav-Communist aggression from north; this fear at root of Greek difficulties.
- 5.
- Bald statements from authoritative US sources which could lead Greek public to believe American policy had changed since announcement Truman doctrine (in that Greece no longer considered important in US strategic planning) could result in collapse of Greek public morale and victory of Communism here.
Fifth assumption above does not in any way invalidate realistic course suggested last paragraph Amag 16571 (sent prior to receipt Gama 1341, December 6) but does point up necessity most careful preparation from public relations standpoint, both in Greece and US, for any shift of emphasis in American reasons for continuing to support Greece.
Whether our limited aim can be achieved of holding line in Greece with amount of aid contemplated obviously depends in large measure on psychological factors. Greek morale has been low since results Grammos operations failed justify optimistic forecasts and has been further depressed by UN failure to show tangible progress toward solving northern frontier problem. Early onset winter has brought discomfort and consequent unrest all sectors Greek people and downright misery and privation to refugees representing 10 percent of population. Crucial point Greek morale traditionally reached into winter and early spring when previous harvet supplies exhausted and [Page 220] spring yields unavailable. Any official and public manifestation diminished US interest in Greece during next few critical months might well prove fatal to Greek will to resist Communism.
However disappointing results so far achieved in Greece with American aid it must be remembered that Greeks almost alone of peoples “united with US in resisting Communist expansion” (paragraph B Gama 1341) are confronted with open warfare instigated and continued at Russian behest.
Success of this Communist technique in Greece would render almost inevitable its employment elsewhere. Hence it is of paramount importance that Greeks continue fight till victory achieved.