868.00/11–2448
Memorandum by the Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey (McGhee) to the Executive Secretariat
As requested in your memorandum of November 24th,1 the following comment is offered on the attached policy planning staff paper [Page 204] “Report on U.S. Aid to Greece”2 which has been received this date. This report is believed to represent a thorough, penetrating and constructive analysis of U.S. aid to Greece, and should prove most helpful in the administration of future aid to Greece, particularly in so far as it represents agreement between the Department of State and ECA on issues of mutual interest. The following observations follow the subdivisions of the report:
- 1.
-
Analysis. The following comments are
offered:
- (a)
- A program of military aid to Greece on a three to four year basis would be a great improvement over the present year-to-year basis. Planning for FY 1950 includes this assumption, although it’s not possible, of course, to make any commitment to the Greeks as long as Congressional appropriations are on a year-to-year basis.
- (b)
- Decision as to whether a Commander-in-Chief of the Greek armed forces would be preferable to the existing arrangement, which includes a Chief of Staff, is a debatable one and one best solved in Athens. The question of availability of a suitable candidate is perhaps decisive. The Secretary has views on this subject. For example, he would prefer a Commander-in-Chief in the field rather than one in Athens as proposed by the King and Greek political leaders.
- 2.
- Conclusions. I concur.
- 3.
- Recommendations. I concur, with the following comment.
The Public Law 75 military aid program is, to the best of my knowledge, being administered in accordance with the policies set forth in the recommendations, with the possible exception of (F). The threat to withdraw all aid from Greece has not yet been resorted to and raises, I believe, grave issues. Its application includes consideration, among other things, of who the threat is made to: a particular minister, the Greek Government or the Greek people. In the first two cases the minister or government may for political reasons resign rather than carry out conditions they consider onerous, whereas the Greek people, if they had adequate political leadership, might be willing and able to carry them out. I do not believe it necessary or desirable to threaten to withdraw aid totally, since I believe it would be against our ultimate interests if the threat had to be carried out, and in my opinion there is adequate bargaining power in threatening to reduce or change the nature of the aid, which makes unnecessary the use of the bargaining power of total withdrawal.3