868.20/10–2248: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State
Amag 1613. I have delayed telegraphing my recommendations concerning General Van Fleet’s proposal outlined Amag 16051 and Amag despatch 2612 in view opportunity afforded by Secretary’s visit to discuss matter with him. Secretary is generally familiar my views, which follow:
Greek forces obviously not progressing as rapidly as was expected in reestablishing security. Notwithstanding heavy losses during past several months, guerrillas still number in excess 23,000 and continue effective threat to Greek independence and obstacle to Greek economic recovery. Recent efforts GNA have provided little encouragement that situation soon will be brought under control, although there is still hope that continued pressure for effective action will have favorable results.
I am convinced lack of progress can not properly be attributed to inadequate personnel or materiel. I believe that physically Greece has [Page 169] substantially all she needs with which to cope with internal guerrilla situation. The army has little offensive spirit, however, and during recent weeks has proven itself unwilling to fight the type of aggressive warfare needed to end the struggle. This unfortunate psychological attitude is due principally to fact that Greek Government has been unable to provide the type of leadership needed throughout all echelons. Another basic reason is widespread feeling that solution to situation is not within power of Greece itself but is depended [dependent] upon broad international events which have placed her as pawn between East and West. Greek leaders are unwilling to look upon their problems as primarily Greek problems, and rely far too heavily upon outside assistance. In the past the unfortunate tendency has been to place blame for reverses upon inadequacies of one kind or another rather than to face up to Greek responsibility to use effectively means already at their disposal.
In this situation I do not believe that substantial increase in armed forces is the proper solution. Until leadership and fighting spirit of the army are improved, mere numbers would be of little avail. Indeed, there is strong possibility that publication of Greek request with forecast that US might approve an expansion in the armed forces may have served further to lessen Greek determination to prosecute war to full extent now possible. I feel that more men in uniform under present inadequate leadership would almost certainly hamper rather than help.
Financial implications outlined in Amag 1605 indicate clearly the economic threat which would be imposed by substantial expansion. Whatever advantage there might be militarily an increase must be weighted carefully with economic repercussions occasioned thereby. Further, although I believe it reasonably safe to assume that Congress will continue to provide some military assistance to Greece so long as her security is threatened, it would appear most unwise to count on Congressional appropriations of such proportion as would be required to finance the forces contemplated, and it would be extremely dangerous to permit Greece to plan on such increase on basis of Congressional appropriations which could not in any case be assured for months.
After most careful consideration I have therefore concluded that the proposed expansions would [should?] not be authorized, although the matters should be kept constantly under review since if continued deterioration occurs it might be necessary for me to recommend a reappraisal of our position. Recent developments have indicated, however, that it is unlikely that present strength can be reduced beginning December as previously contemplated. Moreover, as stated in immediately [Page 170] following Amag 1614,3 I have concurred in Van Fleet’s recommendations for increase approved army strength by 20,000 spaces as part of replacement program.
As alternative to further expansion I shall endeavor in every way to impress upon Greek Government necessity for improving leadership, especially in armed services. While broader problem this connection also includes ineffective political leadership, Department of course aware of dilemma created by desire establish effective government and yet maintain present structure based on democratic parliamentary system. I will also urge development of far-reaching propaganda campaign led by best men available in Greece to do the job, designed to make the people, particularly the army, recognize critical situation with which the country is confronted and their individual responsibility as Greeks to devote themselves wholeheartedly in meeting situation. They must be made to recognize that guerrilla war is their war and primarily their problem, and that there is limit to material assistance which will be provided by US. I would suggest that Greek Government be informed upon Department’s approval of recommendation that increase in present approved strength by 20,000 men for training purposes is authorized, but that direct response to Prime Minister’s note of September 30 be deferred at least for duration of present visit operations in view possible adverse psychological reaction upon both military and civil morale to definite refusal at this time.