868.00/10–2048
Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett)
I found a rather depreciated state of morale in Athens among our Mission, particularly the Military, and in the Greek Cabinet. The [Page 163] individual who depreciated such pessimism most was the King. The reasons are easy to find. The Greek Army was never fully trained. Its officers are those of a rather distant past in all grades, the men are very tired, particularly as they do not see any conclusion in sight so long as the United Nations permits the guerrillas to utilize Albania and Yugoslavia for retreat, refitting, and particularly for lateral tactical moves. The Grammos effort while generally successful permitted 5,000 guerrillas to withdraw across the border and then quickly reappear on the flank. The wooden shoe mines which have inflicted a large number of casualties, principally in blowing off feet, have had a very depreciating effect on morale, plus the fact that no relief is possible under present conditions, no opportunities to visit families, regarding the safety of whom they are very fearful, no possibility of better conditions for the winter than merely holding their own in the cold mountains.
This pessimism is rather natural, and we can find many examples of it in our own experience, notably after April 17, 1917 in the French Army, and in the Aleutians the moment our soldiers saw no enemy, however distant in those islands, to engage their attention, or in the Army in the Apennines in Italy after the mail reflecting public statements about a forgotten army had stirred up a feeling among our men of being sorry for themselves. The successful operation the day of my arrival, culminating on the day of my departure, for the capture of a critical mountain height in the new area to the north of Grammos had a good effect, but this could be but momentary.
The prevailing feeling among the troops, and I found among at least one or two of the American Mission, was a feeling of impotence and deterioration in the situation because of the failure of the United Nations to stop Albania and Yugoslavia from supporting the guerrilla activities.
Bevin had asked me to talk to his Ambassador and the British Commander, which I did. The latter recommended an increase from eight to fifteen divisions, apologizing for a proposal regarding which the British could not pay, and admitting that it could not have any real effect until after about twelve months. Van Fleet would be satisfied with the present Army if it was a well-trained, a good army. All expressed the view that two more divisions would have made it possible to virtually exterminate the guerrillas by the end of the Grammos campaign despite the opportunity to make in complete safety lateral movements along the border, and then reenter Greece. The existing government military forces were inadequate to meet the situation.
[Page 164]My reaction is this:
Something definite and immediate must be done to permit the improvement and refreshment of the Greek Army. The minimum to me seems to be the proposal for an increase of 15,000. If this were done on a basis of “overage”, that is not for an increase of organized units but for men that could be trained for two or three months and then used to replace old men who would be demobilized, or tired men who could be refreshed, I think they would have the basis for establishing a new hope among the men of the Greek Army and a basis for gradually building up the quality of the Army. The same procedure would apply, in my opinion, to an overage of two or three hundred officers, although this was not mentioned by General Van Fleet.
What is happening in Greece is merely an expression in keeping with the local circumstances of the general Soviet or Communist plot, and I think added pressure has been put on the case there because of the failures on other fronts. Incidentally, one evident influence on the minds of the Greek personnel and of our personnel is the natural tendency to ignore or forget that this is but a piece or a portion of the front of the general Soviet effort, and that what we do regarding Berlin or any other Communist effort, subversive or otherwise, has a direct effect on the effort in Greece, and contributes for or against its solution.
I fully realize the hesitancy of the Department and the Army of becoming involved in Congress with an increase in the appropriation for the maintenance of the Greek situation. I am not proposing an increase of materiel, but for the funds to permit the paying and feeding of a fifteen thousand increase in soldiers.
I was surprised to find a general unanimity that the Air [Force] had been the most productive of results in the campaign, inflicting better than 50% of the casualties on the guerrillas. There was, therefore, an urgent recommendation for the provision for additional planes. I do not attempt to analyze this.
I suggested to Yan Fleet that there was a great deal that could be done to stimulate morale that would literally cost nothing, and I recited a number of the measures we took with regard to individual soldiers during the last war.
In all of the foregoing, I am embarrassed by the fact that I am not only speaking as Secretary of State regarding the urgent necessity of maintaining an increasingly strong front in Greece in our struggle with the machinations of the Soviet Union, but inevitably I find myself engaging in military recommendations which normally would not be appropriate to the Secretary of State. However, like a [Page 165] lot of other people, I am only human and I merely refer to this that you can make the best of it in connection with the Army authorities.1
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This message was sent by air courier. The Secretary sent an “eyes only” summary to Mr. Lovett the following day (telegram Martel 70, 868.20/10–2148).
The Secretary discussed the Greek situation with Mr. Bevin on the morning of October 27, at Paris. “Mr. Bevin asked the Secretary whether he regarded the situation as hopeless to which the Secretary replied that he did not provided the necessary measures were taken in time.” (Memorandum by Charles E. Bohlen, 868.00/10–2748. Mr. Bohlen was an Adviser to the United States Delegation to the Third Regular Session of the General Assembly.
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