Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

868.20/9–3048

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

secret

[Paris,] September 30, 1948.

Participants:	Mr. Tsaldaris, Foreign Minister of Greece and Chairman of the Greek Delegation
	The Secretary
	Mr. Villard

I received Mr. Tsaldaris at his request this afternoon. He said he desired to bring to my attention a contemplated step in the program of American aid to Greece whereby the strength of the Greek Army would be reduced by approximately 15,000 men, effective October 20. This reduction, which had been decided upon prior to the recent operations in the Grammos area, had the approval of General Van Fleet but not that of the Greek General Staff.

Mr. Tsaldaris felt that the heavy losses incurred by the Greek Army in the Grammos operation now made it inadvisable to carry out such a plan and that on the contrary the size of the Greek forces should be increased in order to terminate the guerrilla activities before winter conditions set in. In order to study the facts at first hand, Mr. Tsaldaris requested that General Van Fleet and Ambassador Grady should come to Paris to confer with me and, subsequently, discuss the situation with him (Mr. Tsaldaris).

Mr. Tsaldaris pointed out that following the Grammos success, morale in Greece had fallen owing to failure on the part of the Greek Army to clean up the guerrillas immediately. He therefore feared the effect on Greek public opinion of the proposed reduction in size of the Army, particularly as this would lessen the opportunity for rest and recuperation of the fighting forces and the training of reserves.

I said I was well aware of the problem involved. From my personal experience, I knew that the first flush of military success was all too often followed by impatience and disappointment on the part of the public. I was also familiar with the political aspects of this particular problem. We were confronted with the necessity of asking the Congress this year for additional funds for the Greek aid program and I felt sure that General Van Fleet had been compelled to take into account economic considerations of this nature in approving the suggestion for a reduced force.

Mr. Tsaldaris said that he had a memorandum on the subject which he would send me. When he again urged that advantage be taken of my presence in Paris to confer with General Van Fleet and Mr. Grady, I informed Mr. Tsaldaris in strictest confidence that I intended to visit Athens at some appropriate moment in the course of this General Assembly. I asked him to keep this information to himself and particularly not to let anyone in Athens know of my intention. Mr. Tsaldaris assured me he would respect my confidence and that this answer completely satisfied his present request.

As a guide to his own planning for Greece, Mr. Tsaldaris then asked for my views on the course of world events in the next ten to twelve months. I described in some detail the situation as I saw it; that in our relations with the Soviet Union we had reached a milestone; that we no longer had any illusions and that the published story of the Berlin negotiations² had brought the light of day onto the real motives behind Soviet policy. It was our hope that with the curtains now drawn aside, the force of world opinion would in time cause the Russians to change their front. I said that in the end, as I had remarked to Soviet and satellite leaders, the truth must prevail over their evident distortions. The world now had the facts and this constituted a new point of departure.

In conclusion, I described to Mr. Tsaldaris in general terms the recent progress we had made toward military preparedness and the problems involved in making military supplies available to others. Mr. Tsaldaris expressed his thanks and remarked that by next Spring, if training proceeded on the present schedule, Greece would be able to put into the field between two-hundred and two-hundred and fifty thousand soldiers in case of eventualities.

1. Presumably drafted by Henry S. Villard, an Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Third Session of the General Assembly, then meeting in Paris. The Secretary, who was Chairman of the Delegation, initialed the memorandum, which was received in the Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs on October 13 and in Mr. McGhee’s office on October 19. A marginal notation indicates that the memorandum was seen by Mr. Lovett at an undisclosed time.
2. The reference is to Department of State Publication 3298, entitled “The Berlin Crisis: A Report on the Moscow Discussions, 1948”. This publication was released on September 27, 1948.