Policy Planning Staff Files, Lot 64–D563

Draft Report by the National Security Council on the Position of the United States With Respect to Greece

top secret

(Policy Planning Staff Redraft, January 10, 1948)

[Here follow the first five paragraphs as in NSC 5, page 2.]

6. The United States has declared its intention to aid Greece. It is now apparent that the aid program of the United States, which expires June 30, 1948, will not strengthen the Greek Government sufficiently to enable it to withstand Communist pressure without further [Page 25] and more effective US aid. Effective implentation of US policy has also been hampered by lack of centralized control of American activities in Greece.

[Here follow paragraphs 7 and 8, as in NSC 5.]

9. Recognition of the “First Provisional Democratic Government of Free Greece” by Albania, Yugoslavia, or Bulgaria would constitute an open disregard of the resolution of October 21, 1947 of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

[Here follow paragraphs 10 and 11, the same, respectively, as paragraphs 11 and 12 of NSC 5.]


12. The President should consult with appropriate members of Congress to inform them of the changed situation in Greece and to seek assurances of the full support of Congress as a prerequisite for the successful implementation of the measures outlined below. He should make clear to these members of Congress that the decision to take a firm stand in Greece is based on overall political and strategical considerations. He should also emphasize that the measures contemplated will probably make necessary a strengthening of our military establishment in men, equipment, and facilities, involving appropriate measures to attain adequate personnel and equipment.

13. As the success of the present Communist attempts to overthrow the legitimate Greek Government would result in the destruction of the territorial integrity and political independence of Greece, the United States should, in accordance with the principles already approved by the National Security Council as indicated in paragraph 2 above, make full use of its political, economic and, if necessary, military power in such manner as may be found most effective to assist the Greek Government in ending Communist attacks.

14. Any decision to send United States armed forces to Greece within the framework of paragraph 13 above would have to be taken in the light of all the circumstances prevailing at the moment, and the following conditions, among others, would have to be met:

It would have to be clear that without the use of these forces Greek independence could not be preserved;
There would have to be reliable evidence, including recommendations from qualified sources, that these forces could be effectively employed to contribute to the accomplishment of the objective at hand;
The size of the force involved would be such that it could be reconciled with other commitments and obligations affecting our armed forces; and
There would have to be good prospects for the removal of the force within a reasonable time without prejudice to the objective for which it had been committed and without detriment to U.S. prestige.

[Here follows paragraph 15, the same as paragraph 18 of NSC 5.]

[Page 26]

16. We should immediately take steps to strengthen the present U.S. assistance program to Greece. The following are some of the measures that could and should be taken:

U.S. representatives in Greece should be instructed to stiffen their insistence on Greek Government compliance with major United States requirements, fulfillment of which we consider really essential to the success of the program.
Assistance to the Greek armed forces should be increased to the extent necessary to cope with the guerrilla situation by reallocation of funds within the present aid program and by placing emphasis upon military assistance in future programs.
Legislation should be recommended for funds to compensate for expenditures under the present assistance program caused by such unforeseen emergencies as caring for Greek refugees evacuated from guerrilla-threatened areas, a one-third decrease in the Greek wheat crop by reason of drought, and the substantial recent rise in world prices.
Legislation should be recommended for extension of the present assistance program beyond June 30, 1948.

[Here follow paragraphs 17 and 18, the same, respectively, as paragraphs 20 and 21 of NSC 5, except that the last four words of paragraph 21 are omitted in paragraph 18; paragraphs 19 and 20, the same as paragraph 22 of NSC 5, except for minor language changes; and paragraphs 21 and 22, the same, respectively, as paragraphs 23 and 24 of NSC 5.]