840.00/1–2748
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
| Participants: | Mr. Lovett |
| Lord Inverchapel | |
| Mr. Reber, EUR |
Lord Inverchapel opened the conversation by stating that Mr. Bevin had been greatly gratified by the reception given his proposal for a Western Union by the Secretary. The Ambassador said he had reported to London that General Marshall had indicated on January 19 that he was prepared to give full consideration to the extent to which the United States might participate in such a project. In so far as [Page 13] the political and defense organization of Western Europe was concerned Mr. Bevin now felt that the other European countries would wish to have some indication of the extent of United States support of the program, particularly if they were to commit themselves to any defense system. The Ambassador said he had been instructed to suggest on behalf of Mr. Bevin that in view of the importance of this factor it might be useful for the United States and Great Britain at the present time to consider the possibilities of concluding some defense agreement between them to provide against aggression which could reinforce the defense project Mr. Bevin had proposed for Western Europe. In order to clarify the British position in this respect Mr. Bevin was now suggesting that conversations similar to those held in Washington last summer in respect to the Middle East1 should now take place between representatives of both Governments, preferably before February 16 when British and French talks on this subject were scheduled to begin.
I informed Lord Inverchapel that this proposal raised questions of the highest importance and that I was not prepared at this time to make any definite response. What Mr. Bevin was now suggesting would in fact mean consideration of a military alliance between the United States and Great Britain. Before any reply could be made even to the suggestion for holding conversations, Mr. Bevin’s proposal would require most careful consideration by the National Security Council for the purpose of formulating recommendations to the President and would then undoubtedly involve consultation with Congressional leaders. This study could not be completed in time to permit of any conversations before February 16.
The Secretary had welcomed Bevin’s initiative looking toward a closer European union and was prepared to give most careful consideration to the problem it raised with respect to United States participation. This did not, however, necessarily imply any commitment thereto.
I then told Lord Inverchapel that in such an important matter as European union speed was not as important as careful study and indicated that further progress toward realization of this union would be an important factor in determining the extent of United States participation. Furthermore, Congressional consideration of the European Recovery Program which after all was intended to bring about economic improvement and thereby lessen dangers and possibilities of war would be affected if attention were now directed toward military arrangements intended for the same purpose.
[Page 14]In view of the importance of Mr. Bevin’s suggestions, it was agreed that Lord Inverchapel should submit them in writing and that these observations would be considered merely as a preliminary exchange of views.
- For documentation on these conversations, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. v, pp. 485 ff.↩