Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

840.00/1–2748

The British Ambassador (Inverchapel) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

top secret
personal
urgent

Washington, January 27, 1948.

Dear Bob: You asked me to let you have a summary in writing of the oral and informal communication which I made to you this morning¹ on instructions from Mr. Bevin.

I told you that Mr. Bevin was much gratified by the warm welcome given by Mr. Marshall to his proposals for the formation of a Western Union, and by Mr. Marshall’s statement in his letter of the 20th January to me of his “wish to see the United States do everything which it properly can in assisting the European nations in bringing a project along this line to fruition.”

Mr. Bevin’s basic conception is briefly to achieve the economic consolidation of the West through the European Recovery Programme and at the same time to call into being a Western political system founded upon the common way of life of the Western democracies and reinforced by the efforts which will be made to combat Communism in the territories concerned.

A beginning has been made by the joint Anglo-French approach to the Benelux powers,² proposing the conclusion of treaties directed primarily against Germany on the model of the Treaty of Dunkirk. Mr. Bevin regards this approach as the only way in which any progress can be made towards closer unity in Western Europe pending the adoption of some wider scheme in which the United States will play their part. But the treaties that are being proposed cannot be fully effective nor be relied upon when a crisis arises unless there is assurance of American support for the defence of Western Europe. The plain truth is that Western Europe cannot yet stand on its own feet without assurance of support.

Great Britain is only in a position to supply Western European countries with a small part of their economic requirements and, of course, in addition there are the arms and equipment which those countries will require for their own defence. Furthermore, the British Government are not yet in a position to give firm assurances as to the role Britain intends to play in operations on the continent of Europe. They foresee that they will sooner or later be forced into admitting this situation or refusing to discuss it. Either course is likely to land them in trouble. Mr. Bevin has therefore been glad to learn of Mr. Marshall’s remark to me on the 19th January that he was already turning over in his mind the question of the participation of the United States in the defence of Europe. Mr. Bevin recognises that the United States Government might find it difficult specifically to commit United States forces to operate on the continent of Europe. But he considers that, if the United States were able to enter with Great Britain into a general commitment to go to war with an aggressor, it is probable that the potential victims might feel sufficiently reassured to refuse to embark on a fatal policy of appeasement.

Mr. Bevin considers therefore that he should now very secretly broach the whole question of Western security with the United States Administration, put the problem to them frankly and ask for their general views. To this end he envisages a procedure similar to that which was recently adopted with success in regard to the Middle East, when informal talks were held in Washington between representatives of the State Department and the Foreign Office, together with representatives of the British and United States Chiefs of Staff.

You will remember that during the Middle East talks the suggestion was made that we might usefully apply this same procedure of secret, frank and informal discussions, without commitment of any kind on either side, to other segments of what we then described as the crescent of middle lands encircling the Soviet Union.

It is Mr. Bevin’s hope that by means of such talks on Western Europe, the British and United States representatives might, if they were held in the very early future, be able to clear their minds before meeting the French at the forthcoming tripartite talks on Germany, which are to begin in London on the 19th February.³ It is evident to him that this problem of Western security will be raised at the tripartite talks and also in the course of the treaty discussions with the Benelux countries.⁴

Mr. Bevin has accordingly asked me to find out urgently whether the United States Administration would agree to early talks on these lines. If so, Mr. Bevin will be ready to send diplomatic and military representatives to Washington from London in time to begin the discussions early next week.

Yours ever,

Archie

1. See memorandum by Lovett, supra.
2. The American Ambassador in France, Jefferson Caffery, informed the Department in telegram 372, January 22, 1948 from Paris (not printed), that on Bevin’s initiative the British and French representatives in the Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg were instructed the preceding day to propose to the Benelux governments the negotiation of a pact along the lines of the French-British pact of March 4, 1947 (840.00/1–2248).
3. For documentation on this subject, see vol. ii, pp. 75 ff.
4. For documentation on these discussions, see ibid., pp. 104, 115, and 144.