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Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Sweden (Matthews)
I called on Mr. Grafström1 this morning on certain specific matters and then asked how he felt about the present situation in Europe. He said that he was not very happy about it. As to Finland, things seemed quieter for the moment but he did not know how long that would last. He believed the stories that there had been some attempt on the part of “Left Wing” Communists—if there is such a thing—to precipitate a coup, but the government apparently took strong measures to prevent it. It was just possible he thought that the Russians might leave Finland alone for a while though he admitted that this might be partly wishful thinking. I said that I did not see why the Soviet Government should have brought all that pressure to bear to obtain a treaty and then not utilize it. I asked if he thought the Finnish Communists would lose ground if free elections were held in July and he replied in the affirmative. In that case, I said, it seemed to me that the Soviet [Page 113] Union will certainly take action to prevent free elections. Otherwise, the blow to Soviet prestige of having a satellite or semi-satellite country with which a treaty of alliance had just been signed show a trend away from Communism would be more than the Kremlin would wish to tolerate. He agreed with my reasoning. I said that there seemed to be just one factor on the other side: namely, that having found that its tactics of violence had stimulated such a reaction in Europe and the United States, producing American rearmament, the Kremlin might want a general lull for a period. In such case Finland might be left alone for the time-being but I still considered it unlikely. I said that sooner or later Finland must go the way of the other satellites for the simple reason that the Soviet Union just will not tolerate or understand any relationship which does not give it complete domination of each and every government and people within what it considers its sphere. Grafström agreed and said that that was why he thought we might see a period of calm since the Soviet Union had now taken everything within its “sphere”. I said I very much doubted it, though the Kremlin might agree to go softly for a brief period. I quoted to him Stalin’s statement that “an obliging bear is more dangerous than an enemy”. We must therefore be on our guard, I said, against any lull which would be designed merely to help the Communist forces in France and Italy and elsewhere recover some lost ground.
I then read him pertinent excerpts from Mr. Thompson’s memorandum of conversation of April 27 with Alexis Aminoff and Colonel Murray of the Swedish Army.2 He listened with obvious interest but in view of the position so repeatedly taken on the question of neutrality by Mr. Undén he clearly felt that he could not comment to me.
Returning to the subject of Russian intentions, I said that I thought Russia would not permanently rest quietly in what he called its sphere but would sooner or later probe for soft spots. I said I was convinced that the one limiting factor today was Soviet fear of possible American military reaction. I pointed to the examples of Iran, Turkey, Greece, Italy, Western Europe and Germany in all of which we had indicated sufficient interest so that the Soviet must have serious doubts that an overt move might produce war with the United States. I said that in Czechoslovakia and Finland the Soviet Union had clearly felt that American reaction would not have been sufficently strong to mean war hence the Kremlin had pushed ahead. There was a lesson in this for Sweden, it seemed to me, I said. While the Swedish Government and people seemed to feel that the policy of proclaiming neutrality vociferously at least once a week was an insurance against war and a [Page 114] cautious, safe, unadventuresome line, to me it was just the opposite; it was in fact unconsciously a very audacious policy. Every time that Sweden proclaimed neutrality the Swedish Government did two things: (1) it invited a Russian attack or at least strong pressure before any general war took place, and (2) it warned the United States that it did not want help. This seemed to me highly dangerous from Sweden’s point of view since it greatly increased the risk of Sweden being plucked off separately without any general war while Sweden’s friends looked on with regret and indignation but did nothing to help. “One cannot expect the United States to go to war,” I said, “to help a neutral which is unwilling to join with other free nations in the common interest of the Western free world and share common risks and responsibilities. What Sweden failed to understand was the importance of joining with other nations to help prevent a war. It was not just a question of perhaps saving a few weeks of neutrality if war broke out.”
Grafström understood my meaning but felt he was not in a position to comment.