Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

840.20/4–1148

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] April 11, 1948.

(1) The Senator¹ said that, with respect to the program as he understood it, an attempt to get a two-thirds vote in the Congress on a pact involving the type of military guarantees envisaged by the proposals was doubtful and perhaps dangerous at this time. He said that the Congress was anxious to help but that the proposal here was in the nature of an unlimited, open-ended offer of aid to anyone who might reach for it; that in those circumstances he felt (and thought that his Committee was similarly disposed) that a major effect of this, in the light of past experience, would be for the majority of the countries to take one of two lines of action, either to fold their hands and let Uncle Sam carry them, or, secondly, and in his opinion of equal and perhaps greater danger, to let them get a sense of false security which might result in their taking so firm an attitude as to become provocative and give the impression of having a chip on their shoulders.

(2) He recognized fully the necessity for some sort of assurance of aid, but thought that its form must in all events leave the determination to this country as to the circumstances under which we would aid, the type of aid, etc. He repeated the warning that the Senate would not allow a series of automatic incidents to require us to go to war based on the act of two outside parties; that we must always have the right to determine for ourselves when we will act.

(3) I asked whether a literal extension of the Rio provisions would not be acceptable and meet the points he had in mind. He said that he thought it would but that it represented the maximum and that it followed a long history of special associations which were not, as far as I knew, duplicated in Western Europe. I asked whether it would remove the major objections if we were able to treat the North Atlantic area as an extension of the Rio treaty. He said that it might but that he would need to see carefully drawn papers as to the approach.

(4) The Senator agreed that the problem logically divided itself into two parts: (1) the immediate short-term necessity for some reasonable and effective assurance which would not divide Europe into the sheep and goats, and (2) a long-term program which he felt would require the most careful integration with the UN. At this point he referred to a resolution by sixteen Senators for a complete overhaul of the UN veto and other principles.² In his opinion it amounted virtually to a rewrite of the Charter. He said that there had been a full discussion before his Committee with Senator Flanders and Senator Capehart and that, after exposing their complete ignorance of the basic discussions on the necessity for the interim assembly, involving among other things approximately thirty changes in the exercise of the veto, they had agreed to withdraw the resolution or permit its being pigeonholed in the Foreign Relations Committee.

(5) In expanding the subject of a long-range program in some way tied in to the UN concept of collective security, regional pacts, etc., the Senator indicated that he and his Committee had been considering, with groups of Senators who were concentrating their attention on the UN, the possibility of a Senate resolution which might refer to the present situation in the UN, the importance of making that body an effective instrument for the maintenance of international peace, urging the President to give attention to the perfection of certain steps, and dealing with the problem of security in general terms. He said that there was a growing demand for some such action and asked what I thought of it. I told him that, as a curbstone opinion, I thought that such a resolution would fall short of its maximum effectiveness unless it included some reference to the determination of this country to take such steps as might be necessary to bring about the international peace for which the UN was presumably designed. He said he would have to consider this point further. He admitted that it had basic merit but felt it could be dealt with only in general terms. We agreed to consult further on this point. It was my hope, in raising the point, that we could, by the resolution, acquire a degree of backing for a Presidential statement along the lines contemplated by the working paper but with a considerably different slant.

(6) On the subject of immediate steps to be taken, and assuming for the purposes of discussion that the Senator’s conclusion as to the frame of mind of Congress was an accurate estimate of the situation, we discussed the possibility of a statement by the President, after discussion with the Congressional leaders, which might approach the matter from two points of view: first, a statement that the countries of Western Europe, particularly the participants in the Marshall Plan, would be well advised to consider, where appropriate, adherence to the Western European Union or a similar mutual defense pact along regional lines. This position to be backed up by a statement which might indicate that the United States would take particular notice, in any help extended, of those countries which [showed] visible and continuous evidence of their firm determination to resist aggression and to perfect common defense machinery on the basis of self-help and mutual aid, and secondly, an invitation from the President to like-minded countries in search of security and peace to discuss with this country measures which might be taken in the UN toward that objective.

(7) The Senator, while cool on the formal guarantee of a pact, showed a willingness to search out and develop a short-term procedure which would back up the efforts of the Western Union and other Western European countries. He mentioned in particular the fact that the announcement might be made that an invitation had been received by the United States to participate in connection with discussions regarding the pooling of military supplies, standardization of equipment, etc.. and the announcement of our acceptance of that invitation. He said that Foster Dulles³ had communicated with him about this matter repeatedly and that he would want to discuss with him, as one of the principal experts on the UN drafting committee as well as on this subject, the details of any program for which Senate Foreign Relations approval was requested. I told him that I saw no objection to permitting Dulles to act as his adviser if he chose to consult him and that, subject to appropriate checks, I would affirm the comment to him after we had studied the matter further.

Robert A. Lovett

1. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg.
2. This was but one of a great many draft congressional resolutions tabled in the 80th Congress, reflective of a widespread feeling then agitating the U.S. public that the United Nations should be strengthened in a variety of ways if it were to meet the needs of the worsening international situation. For documentation-commentary on these matters, see volume i.
3. John Foster Dulles, Representative on the U.S. delegation to the Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 1947 and frequent delegate or adviser since 1945 on U.S. delegations to the United Nations and other international conferences.