Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

840.50 Recovery/8–3148: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret

London, August 31, 1948—5 p. m.

3916. For the Secretary from Douglas. Reurtel 3312, August 20.

1. Of course I have been aware for some time that a number of those responsible for ECA operations in Europe have been expressing their dissatisfaction with the part played by the UK, and they have repeatedly accused the British of “dragging their feet”. This attitude has been reflected in the American press. I have also noted that the British are extremely sensitive to this charge, to which they would reply, if they were debating the subject, that they have assumed a large measure of leadership and that their contributions to OEEC and to European economic integration have been substantial and constructive. Their attitudes in Paris conferences, as distinct from their actions, may have given the impression of doubt or even disagreement with some of our proposals, but they have not given us lip service nor have they indulged in platitudes.

2. I assume that your request for concrete examples of British failure to act or British unwillingness to cooperate is directed primarily to Harriman, who is in the best position to furnish the bill of particulars as far as Paris is concerned. In drawing up such a bill, I would suggest, some distinction should be made between situations in which the UK has taken the initiative in opposition, as distinct from situations in which the UK has simply taken the same position as other countries. There should also be taken into account the situations in which the UK has made definite contributions, and I am confident that there must be some of these. In general we must guard against jumping to the conclusion that there is something wrong simply because the British disagree with us. It all comes down to a question of motive, and we must distinguish between, on the one hand, honest disagreement for understandable reasons arising out of the complexities of UK relationships with the Commonwealth, European countries or ourselves, and, on the other, reasons which we could legitimately attack as reflecting misguided self-interest.

3. I am, of course, in close touch with Finletter and constantly following ECA relationships with the British, which seem to me to be conducted in an atmosphere of mutual collaboration and confidence. At the same time we have all been concerned over the British failure or apparent failure to go along with us on several problems:

(a) From the beginning of OEEC the British have not fully appreciated the importance of making certain that their representatives in Paris should be people of the highest standing and command the widest possible popular appeal. I talked to Bevin about this when we were pressing for the assignment of an officer of Cabinet rank, but he met the point with an explanation based on the difficulties which arise from the structure of the British Cabinet, and I am sure that even Harriman is not pressing this point now. Personally, I felt that the British made a mistake in sending Oliver Franks to Washington instead of giving him this job in Paris, which he is eminently qualified to fill. It is not so much a matter of rank as it is of personality and intellectual quality, as Franks demonstrated in Paris last year.¹ The present arrangements appear to be far from satisfactory in that both Hoffman and Harriman find Hall-Patch’s² personality unsympathetic, and considerable friction seems to be developing in Paris on this account. The problem of finding a suitable alternative is difficult, but I think we should work on it until it is solved.

(b) I gather that our conversations with the British over the development of a four-year economic project have been making slow progress, even taking into account heavy pressure on the civil service resulting from our multiple requests for rather elaborate import programs. It seems to us obvious that the evolution of a programme for achievement of basic objectives for the longer term and its integration with similar programmes by the other European countries should have first priority at this time and would represent a really constructive step. However, Finletter tells me that he has put this up to the British in words of one syllable and he now has hopes that a more helpful attitude may soon be apparent.

(c) During the ERP labor conference here³ it emerged clearly that the TUC attitude toward collaboration with American and European labor groups in a common program to further recovery objectives and to combat the Communist opposition in Europe can only be described as timid and vacillating. This is probably due less to the attitude of British labor itself than it is to its leadership, and I think that the govt and the Labor party might do more than they have done to encourage a more forthright policy.

4. I would like more time in which to consider the tactics which we should follow in putting these problems up to the British, and I am not sure that an approach by Harriman, Finletter and me is the answer at this stage. On several occasions, when I have gone to Bevin with other Americans, he has shown a tendency to react adversely, as though he felt that we were trying to put pressure on him, and there is danger that he might take a position in such circumstances which might become frozen. My own idea is to go first to Roger Makins⁴ on a completely personal basis and get his opinion, after which I might see Bevin alone and explore the situation a little further. The problem is one of great delicacy, which should be approached cautiously. I agree with Finletter that we must keep after it until we have secured results, particularly in the matter of getting more successful British representation in Paris.

5. Before taxing the British with obstructionism, however, we must ask ourselves whether or not our own objectives in Europe have been worked out in clear and definite terms, framed realistically to take into account the economic and other complexities of the European picture. Reading between the lines of your message I have an uneasy feeling that we have not yet sufficiently coordinated our political, military and economic policies toward Europe, and particularly that we have not yet established the precise relationship of our work with OEEC within that larger framework. I doubt that economic integration can make sufficient progress by itself, and I believe that if it is to be achieved it will probably follow or evolve in parallel with other achievements in the equally vital fields of US political and military foreign policy. I realize that you have already had searching discussion with Lovett, Forrestal and Hoffman to determine our future policy attitudes toward OEEC and the direction and degree of integration in Europe that we want and can expect. In a matter of such fundamental importance it might even be necessary to arrange for periodic consultations of this nature in order to keep our policy toward European integration under frequent review on the highest level. Perhaps we can use the occasion of your visit to Paris (what a jolly time you will have!) to go into this whole problem. I have already discussed all phases of it with Finletter.

6. I have, as you know so well, an intimate interest in the suggestion that you may be considering steps affecting the whole area of US–UK relations, since I am directly involved. I would therefore be grateful for an indication what you have in mind as a possible course of action.

Douglas

1. For documentation on Sir Oliver Franks’ participation in the Paris Conference of the sixteen nations of the Marshall Plan, July 12–15, 1947, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. iii, pp. 338–470, passim.
2. Sir Edmund Leo Hall-Patch, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.
3. March 8–10, 1948.
4. Roger Makins, British Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.