840.50 Recovery/2–1648
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Horsey)
| Participants: | J. N. Henderson, Second Secretary of British Embassy |
| Outerbridge Horsey, WE |
Mr. Henderson said that the Foreign Office had asked the Embassy to inquire from the Department, if possible from the Secretary himself, [Page 1026] as to the truth of a report allegedly issued by the USIS in London to the effect that the Secretary had said there was no impediment to Spain joining the ERP. In order to correct this erroneous report of the Secretary’s comment, I gave Mr. Henderson the exact language contained in the Memorandum of the Secretary’s press conference on February 11.1 This showed that the London report had left out two essential features of the Secretary’s comment, that there was no objection from the US point of view and that this applied only if the 16 countries themselves wished Spain to be included. Mr. Henderson thought that this would correct the dismay created by the first report in London since the Foreign Office felt that the inclusion of Spain would be a departure from the previously announced policy, agreed on with the US, and would remove once and for all all hope of getting rid of Franco.
Elaborating on our position as indicated by the Secretary’s comment of February 11, I said that all our statements and thinking were based on the avoidance of influencing in any degree the decision originally reached by the CEEC countries on the exclusion of Spain. We did not want to give the impression of trying to get them to have Spain included and, on the contrary, we were not laying down arbitrary rules as to the permanent exclusion of any country. I mentioned that Spain’s interpretation of our position had been over optimistic and that we had sought to correct that optimism both in Madrid and here.
As to change in the regime, we heartily shared the British feeling that the continued exclusion of Spain would serve as an inducement to General Franco to bring about substantial political and economic changes in order to qualify for inclusion.
Mr. Henderson thought that this general explanation was entirely satisfactory and said that he would telegraph it to London. He mentioned that the Foreign Office was most anxious to keep in line with us on Spanish policy and hoped that before making any accommodation with General Franco we would at least consult the British.
- Not printed.↩