Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III
711.52/2–648
The Chargé in Spain ( Culbertson ) to the Secretary of State
No. 77
Sir: I have the honor to refer to Departmental telegram No. 903 of December 18, 1947 and to report that on Monday, February 2, I discussed with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senor Alberto Martin Artajo, the position and policy of the United States as outlined in the reference telegram. I enclose with this despatch a copy of the memorandum I made following the conversation with the Foreign Minister and a copy of the paper I had prepared for my own guidance in the presentation of this matter to Sehor Artajo. I, of course, left no papers with him.
Respectfully yours,
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chargé in Spain (Culbertson)
| Participants: | Alberto Martin Artajo, Minister for Foreign Affairs José Sebastián de Erice, Director General of Foreign Policy |
| Paul T. Culbertson |
By appointment I called on the Foreign Minister at 8 p. m., February 2. Señor Erice interpreted.
[Page 1021]I had prepared for my own guidance a statement of what I wanted to say and how I wanted to say it. It is attached. While I did not read from it, I followed the text and wording quite closely. There was considerable side discussion of the various points covered. The meeting lasted for two hours. I left the Foreign Office feeling I had accomplished absolutely nothing. I prefer to wait a few days to see whether this presentation of our policy produces a comeback from the Foreign Minister.
The discussion developed somewhat as follows:
In response to my opening remarks about the press, Artajo called my attention to the fact that the press had, after the U.N. vote, soon dropped its original comment, I agreed that that was true. (When this sort of stuff first appeared in the local press, I saw Erice and told him it was the most stupid approach to American psychology possible.) With regard to the Hispanicus article (see Embassy’s despatch No. 55 of January 27)1 Artajo was surprised that I should find objection, saying the article was designed to bring the Marshall Plan prospects for Spain back into focus since the Spanish press had developed an over-optimistic line. I told him it was a question of the tone and attitude—a thing which both Erice and Artajo did not seem to be able to understand.
After covering the point that we cannot be expected to make all the moves “to erase the reasons for the differences which have made and still make normalization slow and difficult” (#3 of notes), I was rather startled to find blank expressions on both Erice’s and Artajo’s faces. I said “You understand what I mean?”, to which I received denials. I told them I had no desire to be specific; that they must realize that Spain as a police state, where there was great political repression and where practically everything was considered a crime against the State and, therefore, subject to trial by military tribunal—these were things which were incomprehensible to American public opinion. I cited a couple of recent trials, one being the trial of seventeen Socialists, the only charge against them being that they tried to organize, and peacefully, a political party and yet the top people had been sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. Artajo came back by saying they would be released in a year or so. I could not avoid the rejoinder that if that be the case, why the 25–year sentence!
On the point (#3) with regard to our revised attitude toward the Regime itself, Artajo merely nodded his head.
With regard to private credits (#4), I expounded the question of commercial risk with a slight prod at INI and Government interference in private enterprise. Artajo was of the opinion that the situation [Page 1022] could be worked out but, of course, the Government was obliged to establish and maintain certain controls and would have to approve obligations assumed by its citizens or industries.
When I got on to the question of governmental credits (#5) there was obvious disappointment and again blank expressions so far as understanding what I meant by giving “concrete signs of its intention of moving toward greater economic efficiency and democratic liberalization”. So I again explained my reluctance to give specific examples, but I again went over the political repression, the military courts, and so forth. Artajo came back at considerable length by saying that if the Regime were to liberalize in a manner such as I apparently had in mind revolution and civil strife would break out here and the credits received by reason of their liberalizing action would have to be used to restore order. He stated we would have the same situation here that we have in Greece. I joined that by saying that I failed to find any basis for comparison and, furthermore, that so far as I could see there was a tendency on the part of the Regime to consider everyone, with the possible exception of Monarchists, who disagreed with the Regime to be a Communist. Artajo’s remark about revolution could be taken to mean that the Regime considers itself not too strong and cannot, therefore, run any risks of releasing its iron grip.
I had previously explained to Erice and Artajo the situation with regard to the E.R.P. 2 so that in going over it again I was giving them nothing new. They do feel they have been unjustly excluded and that Spain is an important cog in the European economic organization. I gathered from what was said that they blame Britain and France for being excluded. They cited the fact that since the first meeting of the CEEC Spain has concluded commercial agreements with Sweden, Ireland, Turkey, Holland and Switzerland—all CEEC members.
They were again disappointed over what I had to say with regard to the level of diplomatic representation (#7) but showed a tendency to understand our position even though they do not agree with it. In fact, they have since sent me a long treatise3 on the meaning of the 1947 U.N. action. Artajo complained that we were influencing South American countries not to raise the rank of their representations here. I replied by saying that that was not true except in so far as those countries might have been influenced by our own position.
As I was leaving, Erice told me they would send me a list of the liberalizing and modifying steps the Government had taken in recent years. I said that I was more interested in a statement of what was going to be done in the future and when.
Notes by the Chargé in Spain (Culbertson)
I have recently received instructions from my Government to discuss with you and with General Franco the American position and policy toward Spain and the Government of Spain—what Ave would like to do and what we can do.
- 1)
- Last December after the vote in the U.N.—a vote largely due to the work of the American U.N. delegation—the Spanish press, particularly Arriba, came out with statements to the effect that now that the other countries of the world have seen the errors of their way, why don’t they do so and so? The other day Arriba printed an editorial by Hispanicus with regard to Spain and Communism, Spain and the Marshall Plan. You have no doubt read it. The article is all the more important, if rumor is correct that Hispanicus is in fact the Chief of State or someone very close to him. If the press following the U.N. action and this recent editorial represent the position and policy of the Spanish Government, I must frankly say that normalization of relations between Spain and the western countries and the restoration of Spain to her rightful position of importance among them as a community of nations will not be easy. It must be an effort based on mutual cooperation and understanding.
- 2)
- My Government is desirous of bringing about a complete normalization of the political and economic relations between our two countries, and it will be our purpose and intention to use our influence and good offices in bringing about the same degree of normalization between Spain and the other western countries. That can not however be accomplished from one day to the next and particularly if we are expected to make all the moves to erase the reasons for the differences which have made and still make normalization slow and difficult. I have come to realize since I came to Spain that many people here find it difficult to understand our reasons for these differences. Nevertheless they must be understood, and it must be realized that the march of world events and present American attitude toward Moscow do not wash the slate clean of the reasons for past and present differences.
- 3)
- Past American policy toward Spain has looked to a complete change of regime here. That is now changed. The form or composition of the Spanish Government is for the determination of the Spanish people. We do feel however that the Spanish people should have some better opportunity to express themselves. We are not trying to reverse the results of the Civil War nor do we wish to see the Spanish State [Page 1024] weakened to a point where civil disorder might develop or political strife arise.
- 4)
- We do not wish to have the economic situation in Spain deteriorate further. An economically strong Spain is in the general interest of everyone and every western country. The export discrimination against Spain has recently been withdrawn and Spain has been placed in the same position with regard to American export controls as all other western European countries. We have in the past objected to the extension to Spain of substantial private credits particularly those which go beyond the scope of normal short term commercial credits. As soon as we have reached a final understanding between the two countries on the question of gold, very substantial private credits can and will be extended to Spanish industry and we shall raise no objection to such private credits, leaving however the question of commercial risks entirely to the American banks and industries involved.
- 5)
- We are not at this time prepared to extend governmental credits to Spain but such credits are possible and we are prepared to give sympathetic consideration to such credits if the Spanish Government gives concrete signs of its intention of moving toward greater economic efficiency and democratic liberalization and takes open action which would make feasible and practicable in the light of American public opinion such a step on our part.
- 6)
- Such action on the part of the Spanish Government would be a step of the greatest importance with regard to Spain’s inclusion in the Marshall Plan. The question of Spain’s inclusion in this Plan is initially up to the countries of western Europe. The legislation now before the American Congress provides for the extension of credits and aid to those countries of Western Europe who by cooperative effort and organization are endeavoring to bring about economic and peaceful stabilization in Europe. The adjustment of the Spanish-French border problem is also a first step to a normalization of economic relations in Europe, and I am glad you have been able to find a mutually acceptable understanding and at the same time I appreciate your readiness to understand France’s political difficulties in arriving at an understanding. Recriminations either way or an attitude of correcting a wrong would be of advantage to no one. If arrangement between Spain and the 16 other countries can be brought about, the further steps required as far as the United States is concerned can be adjusted.
- 7)
- One further point—that of the level of the diplomatic representation between our two countries. Our delegation at Lake Success had fair success in holding down United Nations pressure on the question of Spain. What we were able to do however was only to avoid a reiteration of the 1946 resolution. That resolution was not cancelled by the [Page 1025] 1947 action. Our basic international policies are based on the concept of a world society of nations—the U.N. We have made every effort to make a real United Nations and to that end we have accepted compromise and retreat. We attach great importance to the observance of U.N. recommendations and the principle of majority action. For the United States to change her diplomatic representation to Spain at this time would give excuse to the U.S.S.R. to violate U.N. recommendations. They are likely to do it any way, but they will not be able to cast stones at us. To cancel standing resolutions of the U.N. a two-thirds majority is required. You, of course, feel that the attitude of many countries toward the Spanish regime is without justification. Nevertheless, to get them to change, Spain could well take action looking to political and economic liberalization.
- 8)
- We are not in a position nor would it be proper for us to suggest the nature of the action to be taken. Certainly I am not here for the purpose of criticizing. I can however in a friendly, frank way point out those practices and policies of the Spanish Government which my Government and the American people find difficult to understand and which tend to keep alive differences between our two countries.
- 9)
- I have one personal observation to make. From my observations since my arrival in Spain and from my conversations with you, I have a feeling that the Regime’s long range plans and programs for Spain and the Spanish people have as their end result liberalization and democratization very little different from the ideas and concepts which the American people have. If that be true, it is my feeling that our basic differences of opinion involve the question of time for initiating in more definitive form those plans and programs. If they could be initiated now they would receive the approbation and support of the American people as well as of the peoples of other western countries. Such action would make it possible for the world to understand and appreciate Spain and bring her into her rightful high position in the community of nations.