865.014/1–2348
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of
the Division of African Affairs (Palmer)
top secret
[Washington,] January 23, 1948.
Participants: |
Mr. W. D. Allen, Counselor, British Embassy |
|
Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, AF
|
Mr. Allen called today at his own request and left the attached note
regarding present British thinking on the future of Libya.
[Page 892]
In presenting the note, Mr. Allen stated that he had been instructed to
emphasize to the Department that the ideas set forth in the note only
represented current thinking, although such thinking was in an advanced
stage.
He also stated that the group which was working on this question in
London was hopeful that, in the event the American Government found it
possible to support British trusteeship over both Tripolitania and
Cyrenaica, it would also be willing to associate itself with the British
Government in explaining the reasons therefor to the French and Italian
Governments.
Mr. Allen also revealed that the working group was somewhat disturbed
about the timing of this whole matter in view of the fact that, if the
decision were taken to place all of Libya under British Trusteeship, the
plan would be known by August or September and might have repercussions
affecting the Italian vote in the November elections.
Mr. Allen was told that, as he already knew, we had not made up our minds
on the Tripolitanian question and that we have been anxious to see the
findings of the Commission of Investigation and to await the outcome of
the Italian elections on April 4 before doing so. We would, however,
give every consideration to the British note and would pass along any
thoughts we had on the subject as soon as possible.
[Annex]
Ex Italian Colonies
As regards the future of Libya, the Foreign Office are on the verge
of deciding that the advantage lies in working for a United Kingdom
trusteeship for Libya as a whole (with the possible exception of the
Fezzan). It will be recalled that in the recent talks1 the
possibility was discussed that the United Kingdom might try for a
trusteeship for Tripolitania, as well as for Cyrenaica. Apart from
the strategic advantages, British representatives on the spot point
out that the inhabitants of the Arab countries wish for the eventual
unity of Libya and are more likely to agree to an intervening period
of United Kingdom trusteeship (with full internal self-government)
leading to full independence after a term of years, if the
trusteeship enshrines the principle of the unity of Libya. They also
point out that any attempt to place Tripolitania under Italian
trusteeship would meet
[Page 893]
with such violent Arab opposition as to react extremely unfavourably
on the prospects of a trusteeship for Cyrenaica alone.
At the same time, the Foreign Office are inclining towards an Italian
trusteeship for Somaliland and at least part of Eritrea, including
Massawa. In Tripolitania the Foreign Office are thinking of the
return of Italian settlers now in Italy (about 60,000), the
organization of Italian settlers, where possible, into community
groups, adequate arrangements for courts, a bureau or special
representative for the Italian community in the administration, and
a proportionate number of representatives of the Italian settlers in
the eventual legislative body. With regard to the last point, it
would of course be necessary for the Italian settlers to renounce
Italian citizenship and to become nationals of Libya, if they are to
participate in any legislative body, and this seems to the Foreign
Office to be in their best interests.
The Foreign Office consider it to be most important that the
Emir,2 and also the leaders in Tripolitania,
all of whom have asked for the advice of the British Government,
should be told of the British Government’s general line before the
Four-Power Commission visits Libya early in March. They would be
informed that British policy would be independence for Libya as a
whole, but that since further internal development was necessary
before Cyrenaica and Tripolitania could stand by themselves, the
British plan was for an intervening period of United Kingdom
trusteeship, with complete internal autonomy. It would be pointed
out to them that this might be the only alternative to Italian
trusteeship, at least for Tripolitania. The Foreign Office hope
that, while they would probably ask the Commission for immediate
self-government, they would say that, failing this, a period of
United Kingdom trusteeship on the lines suggested would be
acceptable.
If the way is to be prepared in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania in the
middle of February (the latest practicable date), something will
have to be said to the French by the British Government in the near
future in order to avoid their hearing first through Arab sources.
This is also desirable in order that the French representative on
the Four-Power Commission may receive suitable instructions if the
French can be persuaded to agree with these ideas. Since the French
will almost certainly tell the Italians, something may also have to
be said to the latter.
The Foreign Office hope that the United States Government will agree
to their going ahead on these lines.
Washington
, 23
January, 1948.