761.00/3–1548: Telegram
The Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary of State
priority
419. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary from Kennan. I have naturally been much concerned over trend of events in Europe, as reflected in informational items Department has been kind enough to send to me, and thought perhaps a word of comment might be helpful to you.
I have always felt that the Russians neither wanted nor expected a military contest with US and that no military complications were likely to occur in our relations with them unless: (a) their political fortunes were to advance too rapidly in Europe and they were to become dizzy with success; or (b) they were to become really alarmed for security of their power in eastern Europe and to take foolish and precipitate action to prevent its dissolution.
Strangely enough, in their recent actions in Europe I think there is something of both these elements. I suspect that many of the European Communists, partially victims of their own propaganda, are excited by recent successes and by prospect of seizing rich prizes in western Europe. On the other hand, the savage abruptness and cynical unconcern for appearances of recent action in Czechoslovakia leads me to feel that Kremlin leaders must be driven by sense of extreme urgency. They probably realizing that they are basically over-extended in eastern Europe and that unless they can break unity of western Europe and disturb ERP pattern it will be difficult for them to hold on in eastern and central Europe, because resulting material contrast, added to the incurable desire of all eastern and central European [Page 849] peoples to be considered part of western civilization, would probably prove decisive in the end.
If this analysis is correct, then there is indeed a real and new element of danger in present situation, and we must be prepared for all eventualities. Top priority is of course due to effort to improve our basic military reserve position at home. As far as Europe is concerned, Italy is obviously key point. If Communists were to win election there our whole position in Mediterranean, and possibly in western Europe as well, would probably be undermined. I am persuaded Communists could not win without strong factor of intimidation on their side, and it would clearly be better that elections not take place at all than that Communists win in these circumstances.
For these reasons I question whether it would not be preferable for Italian Government to outlaw Communist Party and take strong action against it before elections. Communists would presumably reply with civil war, which would give us grounds for reoccupation Foggia fields or any other facilities we might wish. This would admittedly result in much violence and probably a military division of Italy; but we are getting close to the deadline and I think it might well be preferable to a bloodless election victory, unopposed by ourselves, which would give the Communists the entire peninsula at one coup and send waves of panic to all surrounding areas.1
- A handwritten
notation at the end of the document reads:
- “1. Action to outlaw CP. before election or to postpone election would be certain to cause civil war.
- “2. Non-communist parties have a good chance of winning election without any such drastic steps.
- “3. Therefore action recommended by GFK seems unwise. Instead, U.S. Govt, should do everything it properly can to strengthen non-communist forces and parties. J[ohn] D. H[ickerson]”