865.24/3–1348: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy
urgent
Niact 680. Personal for Ambassador’s eyes only from Hickerson and Dowling.
Since De Gasperi has taken into account (urtel 1112 Mar 13)1 all points suggested Deptel 677 Mar 12, postponement eqpt for Ital armed forces is more than ever disturbing. If program is of vital importance which all indications lead us to believe—and it is surely unwise to assume Communists would meekly accept electoral defeat without [Page 786] resort to direct action—then decision, taken in conjunction FonOff view reported urtel 1047 Mar 11,2 reflects either a), attitude of defeatism, presumably arising primarily from Czech developments, which means Ital Communists have already achieved one major objective, i.e., intimidation of Ital Govt so as to preclude positive action in self-defense; or b), that Ital Govt has been lulled into feeling false security, which serves equally well for attainment ultimate Communist aims.
Thus decision may adversely affect US national interest, which requires maintenance Italy as stable, independent nation, by denying to Ital armed forces eqpt which is essential if they are to cope successfully with any Communist attempt to seize power. Implications thereof must be carefully considered in connection studies outlined Deptel 660, Mar 11,3 since liability for US and Western powers may be much heavier than we had estimated. Pls let us have your view this regard.
Re last para urtel 1112, you are of course aware of heavy demands from many sources for limited availabilities US eqpt. We could not hold large quantities eqpt now assembled on mere chance Itals might decide in future eqpt might be needed, and if eqpt is returned to points of origin, time and effort expended in getting it together would have to be duplicated. Only basis on which programmed eqpt might possibly be held briefly for Itals would be immediate assurance of eventual reimbursement plus firm agreement on early shipping date.
We accept view there is no use proposing De Gasperi reverse decision. In view of gravity of matter, however, we feel he must not be left under any illusion he can expect to receive eqpt as desired at some specified future date. We think you shd therefore see him at once to explain that only with greatest effort has it been possible assemble requested eqpt; that his decision has come as complete surprise in view of urgency which he had insisted upon and in which we continue to believe; and that survey shows no possible arrangement which would permit scheduling shipment as desired by him. We would be glad, if he desires, to endeavor to work out with Dept of Army arrangements for brief temporary storage at points embarkation; we do not yet know if this can be done, and in any event he must realize that in fairness to other claimants for limited availabilities US eqpt we could attempt such arrangements only if we receive from him at once assurance of eventual reimbursement as well as firm agreement shipment can be made at reasonably early and mutually satisfactory date. Otherwise, he must understand, no commitment can be undertaken for [Page 787] future implementation this or any similar program.4 [Hickerson and Dowling.]
- See footnote 3, above.↩
- In this telegram, not printed, Dunn reported a conversation with the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs who gave the view that Italy’s position with regard to “Western Union” was very delicate as long as the Yugoslavs could occupy the Veneto whenever they would wish: Italy would need a military guarantee (840.00/3–1148).↩
- Ante, p. 45.↩
- In niact 1137 of March 15, not printed, Dunn reported that De Gasperi planned to consult Einaudi, Facchinetti, and General Trezzani, and that he had asked whether the matériel could be shipped to Germany to be held for delivery in Italy about May 15 (865.24/3–1548).↩