865.24/3–1248: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy
urgent
Niact 677. Personal for Ambassador’s eyes only from Hickerson and Dowling. De Gasperi’s decision as reported urtel 1062 Mar 12 has of [Page 785] course come as complete surprise. On basis repeated requests for urgent action, which, stressed vital importance this program, as well as on basis informal assurances De Gasperi’s personal endorsement (CA 46 from Stilwell), ships in US and trains in EuCom were actually standing by awaiting final instructions which were to have been issued immediately upon receipt favorable reply Deptel 635 Mar 10.
We wonder therefore if PriMin took foregoing wholly into account, and if he was fully aware postponement at this stage would mean no commitment could be given for future implementation this or similar program. At very best, postponement means many weeks intensive work will have been lost. We should have to begin again almost immediately to have any chance of getting eqpt to Italy in May, and to begin again we obviously must have without much delay firm assurance reimbursement.
We agree Communists will endeavor make political capital out of US eqpt to Ital armed forces, but are convinced this propaganda will be continued regardless of any factual basis. Has PriMin considered whether Communist propaganda is not in fact intended to prevent any strengthening forces upon which Ital Govt would have to depend for maintenance law and order, and whether postponement of program would not play directly into their hands.
In brief, has De Gasperi fully realized gravity of decision he is making. We want your own views this regard before considering whether you shd take matter up again with him.3 [Hickerson and Dowling.]
- In niact 1112 of March 13, not printed, Dunn reported that he had explained to De Gasperi all of the points of the instruction, that De Gasperi thoroughly understood the background, and that he, Dunn, believed there would be no use in a further approach at this time (865.24.3–1348).↩