S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63D351, NSC 1 Series
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)1
Subject: The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy in the Light of the Possibility of Communist Participation in the Italian Government by Legal Means.
In accordance with your informal request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied a draft report prepared by the National Security Council staff entitled, “Position of the United States with Respect to Italy in the Light of the Possibility of Communist Participation in the Government by Legal Means” (NSC 1/3) forwarded by you on 8 March 1948 and scheduled for consideration by the National Security Council on 11 March 1948.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed this paper to the extent possible in the very brief time available, and have limited their comments to those portions having apparent major military implications.
With reference to the conclusion in paragraph 9 a to the effect that the United States should strengthen its military position in the Mediterranean area, little action, except increase of our Mediterranean [Page 783] naval force, could be taken that would not involve actual stationing (with prior political arrangements) of United States forces either in Italy or its islands or on some other foreign territory such as Malta or Tripoli. As for forces available, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would reiterate the following comment made in their memorandum to you dated 19 February 1948 in connection with their study of NSC 1/2:
“…. The United States could strengthen its naval and air forces in the Mediterranean area outside of Italy without dangerously lowering its available reserve of such forces. However, deployment of ground forces in the same area would require commitment of part or all of our reserve in this category, a reserve which, in view of our extended military position, is already dangerously low. This should not be done unless a partial mobilization is undertaken to enable the United States to have available a comparatively large, trained strategic reserve with which to reinforce units outside the United States if required.”
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the over-all world situation, of which that in Italy is only a part, dictates the necessity for strengthening immediately the potential of our National Military Establishment. Some form of compulsory military service is essential if timely and effective strengthening of our potential is to be achieved, since this is the only method short of mobilization which can produce desired results without long delay. The foregoing does not exclude the desirability of Universal Military Training but it is only from the long-range point of view that initiation of such training will be useful.
In view of the time elements involved in obtaining authorizations and appropriations and then in implementing any strengthening of the National Military Establishment (including selective service), it is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, if it be determined that it is essential to strengthen the potential of the National Military Establishment, measures to accomplish this should be initiated at once.
Regarding subparagraph 10 a, which concludes that, if the Communists obtain domination of the Italian Government by legal means, the United States should immediately take steps to accomplish a limited mobilization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that neither limited nor general mobilization will result in appreciable augmentation of our combat strength for at least one year after mobilization is actually initiated.
It must be emphasized that decision as to the timing of steps to accomplish any mobilization should take into full account the inherent lag between such steps and the combat availability of resultant forces.
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
- Copies were sent also to the Secretary of State, to the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, to the Secretary of the Army, to the Secretary of the Navy, and to the Secretary of the Air Force.↩