840.20/9–348
Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, September 3, 1948, 3 p. m.
Mr. Lovett inquired if the working paper of September 21 was considered to be satisfactory for transmittal to the governments as a brief summary of the discussions that had taken place. He felt that the time had come to inform the various governments of the lines of thought which had emerged and that their comments would be needed to make further progress.
Mr. Wrong agreed that the time had come when there should be reference back to the governments. Subject to some very minor suggestions he believed something had been arrived at which would provide the governments with a good deal of meat to chew on and which was sufficiently definite and clear-cut to enable them to assess the project and to give guidance for the next stages of the talks. The part of the paper on territorial scope had not been as fully digested as the rest of the paper but might be acceptable as a basis for further progress by the governments. There would still be a good deal of work to do in amending the latter part of the paper, particularly the annex, which was really the heart of the paper.
Baron Silvercruys thought the paper an extremely useful document. He believed the time had come to arrive at some realistic basis and see what the governments were really prepared to do and how far they were prepared to go. He hoped that it would be quickly considered by the governments and instructions given which would permit the whole matter to be further pursued. There was nothing final in the document; it was intended merely to give a picture of what had been very much in the minds of the participants. It also disclosed [Page 229] the effort made to get together. He was prepared to forward the paper as it stood and to supplement it by giving the background in order that it might be properly assessed.
Mr. Lovett thought it would be desirable if not essential for the governments to have the color supplied to this rather precise and distilled document. He hoped that if it were decided to forward the document the representatives of the various governments would find it possible to give their respective foreign offices a picture of the various phases that had been gone through. If domestic politics were the art of the possible, international politics might be called the art of the almost impossible.
Dr. Van Kleffens praised the efforts of the working group. There was inevitably an arbitrary choice as to the time at which the working paper or any paper should be submitted to the governments. That part of the paper which concerned territorial scope had come to his knowledge only in a preliminary form the night before and there had been no opportunity to exchange views on it. Dispatch was desirable because considerable exchanges of views amongst the governments would be necessary. Nevertheless he believed there should be some discussion of the paper on territorial scope. He had no instructions on this point, but had put on paper certain remarks concerning it and would like to have them discussed.
Mr. Lovett agreed that there was no magic in any particular date for disposing of the paper and asked if there were further comments.
M. Bonnet agreed that the time had come to send something to the governments but had no objection to another session of discussion. Complete and detailed instructions could not be received until the governments had had a full opportunity to study the document. Of course they had been kept informed during the last month of the development of the work, but these discussions could not go much farther without consultation with the respective governments.
The only point he wished to stress, as he had already done more than once, was that it was well understood that this document was entirely preliminary and that for the French Government there was a link between the work which had been done and was being done here and the work of the Military Commission in London. His government wanted to have, if possible, an agreement on two points at least which must be discussed in London; first, the question of assistance in rearming the Western European armies, and second, an understanding between the Western Powers and the United States on the manner in which an emergency would be met and where it would be met.
Mr. Lovett agreed that M. Bonnet had covered these points repeatedly. [Page 230] The present document dealt with a long range program. It was of complete indifference to the U.S. Government whether a long-range or short-range program was discussed. It was his understanding that everything reasonable human beings could do with respect to the short-range problem was being done. The sense of urgency in these discussions came from others, not from the United States. The United States was prepared to discuss either or both, but it would not be possible to go ahead on the long-range problem if it were to be contingent on the short-range one. The short-range problem would have to be met with very cold realism. If the French Government felt that solution of the short-range problem [was a prerequisite?], he was not sure that any useful purpose would be served by continuing to discuss the present document. If it developed that any one or more of the countries felt it was unworkable or if conditions which could not be realistically met were attached, then the United States would have learned a lot in the process, but the common cause would not have been advanced. He would leave it to the representatives of the Brussels Treaty signatories to make the decision since their governments were responsible for these conversations being held.
M. Bonnet thought there was at least a slight misunderstanding of his position. Mr. Lovett has made clear that the United States could not accept a solution of the long-range problem except by constitutional processes. Nothing definite could be concluded for several months. He hoped that in the meantime there would have been a full exploration of the short-range problem. It should be possible to go on working on the long-range problem and to try in the meantime to find by mutual agreement a settlement of the intermediate problems which preoccupied his Government. He believed the short-range problem was now being discussed in London with the participation of American representatives. The fact that the two kinds of work had gone on in a parallel way was encouraging. Why not work on both at the same time? The purpose of his remark was to remind Mr. Lovett and his colleagues that he has always insisted on the link, which existed for the French Government, between a satisfactory solution of the short-range problem and a satisfactory solution of the long-range one. The more complete the answer given to the questions France was asking in London, the tighter could be the pact to be concluded. A solution for the short-range problem would make it easier to find a solution for the long-range one.
Mr. Lovett agreed that there might have been some misunderstanding and that some of the things M. Bonnet had just said contributed toward a meeting of minds. He had assumed that it had been made clear throughout that discussion of the long-range problem had not [Page 231] in any way interfered with an accelerated solution of the short-range. If that were so he found it hard to understand what obstacle lay in the way of considering the long-range problem.
M. Bonnet agreed that there was no obstacle at all.
Mr. Lovett reverted to M. Bonnet’s statement that the French Government would have certain conditions with respect to acceptance of a long-range program. All Governments would have certain conditions to make. The United States was making no proposals whatsoever. The working paper was merely a report to the various Governments—he would have to report to his own—on the various factors which had emerged. There was no assurance that any pact at all would result. Certainly there was no commitment by anyone at the table to take any course of action. He thought that with this background there was an understanding between M. Bonnet and himself.
M. Bonnet agreed.
Sir Oliver Franks thought it would be difficult to get much further without reporting back to the governments. The conversations in the working party and around the table had gone a long way to develop the general contours, but to go beyond that to definition would require approval and more authority than anyone now had. He saw no objection to a further discussion around the table here but was prepared himself to forward a document very much like that under discussion to get the general response of his Government.
Mr. Lovett asked Mr. Jebb, as one of the architects of the Brussels Treaty, if he would care to comment.
Mr. Jebb thought the ideas in the part of the paper on territorial scope would have to be very carefully examined, particularly as to which countries apart from the Brussels Treaty Powers and the United States and Canada would fit into the various categories. He thought this question should be examined by the governments at this stage, perhaps by the Brussels Treaty Powers meeting together. Probably the Foreign Ministers themselves would like to have a general discussion about it because the intimate relations within the Brussels Treaty were matters of delicacy and considerable importance to them. He thought it might be placed on the agenda of the next meeting of the Consultative Council, which was to meet before the middle of October.
Mr. Lovett observed that the redraft of the paper on territorial scope had been presented by the State Department in an attempt to set down, for the purpose of study and discussion, some of the problems which had arisen in the earlier exchanges of views. The suggestion of various types of membership was an attempt to indicate a solution. It was not advanced as a definite proposal but rather as a line of thought, a method. The more proposals of such a tentative [Page 232] character were made the better. He himself would have certain reservations but nothing of an order of magnitude to make him believe that a solution was impossible.
Italy presented a problem on which he believed the Brussels Pact signatories would want to express a very definite view one way or the other. These were items for study and adjustment if someone could produce a better program. He asked whether the other representatives would prefer to forward the working paper now or discuss it further.
Mr. Wrong felt that the October meeting of the Brussels Treaty Consultative Council did impose a sort of time-table in that the paper should be laid before the Governments concerned, particularly those of Brussels Treaty Powers, in time for it to be duly weighed and assessed in the respective foreign offices before the meeting. He suggested that the paper be further discussed and perhaps amended, but that it be forwarded if possible within a week.
Dr. Van Kleffens believed the outstanding questions were of a fundamental nature and should be further discussed.
Sir Oliver Franks agreed and favored Mr. Wrong’s suggestion.
M. Bonnet felt that the paper should be forwarded without any protracted delay.
Baron Silvercruys was prepared to go over the paper again but believed the views of governments should be obtained very shortly.
It was agreed that the paper should be further considered by the working party and subsequently by the group as a whole with a view to forwarding it to governments by September 10.