840.20/9–248
Memorandum of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Working Group Participating in the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, September 2, 1948
Mr. Jebb reported to the group that Mr. Bevin had expressed considerable concern over the emphasis being placed in these Talks on the establishment of machinery for the solution of common economic and cultural problems. In his view, this would not only duplicate much of the machinery now in existence, such as the OEEC, but might inject considerable confusion into the international picture and slow up the present progress of the European nations toward that union which they all believe is so essential. Mr. Wrong pointed out, however, that the present Talks had as their objective the establishment of machinery for the long future, of an organization and agencies which would be operable for a very long time, whereas the OEEC, which had been cited, currently has a statutory limitation set at the year 1952. In this connection, Mr. Kennan suggested that the provision in the articles of the working group’s paper calling for encouragement of economic and cultural cooperation should be permissive in nature rather than concrete in its terms. In this way provision would be made for the possibility of such development without explicitly calling for machinery to achieve it. On the other hand, he believed that some such mention should be made in whatever treaty might be agreed to, since he felt that it would be a mistake, politically and psychologically, to put forward before the world at this time a pact or regional arrangement which proved to be a strictly military alliance.
[Here follows a paragraph concerning the wording and possible rearrangement of various sections of the draft “Outline of Provisions Which Might be Suitable for Inclusion in a North Atlantic Security Arrangement.” For final version, see September 9 “Washington Paper,” page 237.]
Inviting the group’s attention to a paper prepared by the U.S. representatives entitled “Territorial Scope of a North Atlantic Security Arrangement and Its Relationship to the Security of Other Nations”,1 Mr. Kennan discussed the basis for establishing three categories of membership in the projected security arrangement. He pointed out that such nations as Iceland, Portugal and Denmark (Greenland) would be valuable in the regional arrangement primarily because of their geographic position and for the facilities which they might be [Page 227] able to provide in the event of hostilities. In effect, they would hold membership on an associate basis; their chiefs of staff, for example, would not attend the military conversations which would be necessary in connection with the operation of the treaty. Nations in this category, he suggested, might be considered as “stepping stone” countries. He believed that by establishing these categories the group could arrive at a clearer definition or concept of the security arrangement and would have a sort of “guide rail” to adhere to in the future when the question arose as to the accession of other countries.
Mr. Jebb inquired what might be done in the case of Norway, who, on the one hand, might not wish to adhere to the Brussels treaty and yet, on the other, might decline to enter a North Atlantic pact except on the basis of full membership. Mr. Kennan believed that Norway properly belonged in the second category, since its principal role in the event of a war would be to provide certain facilities and bases, adding that the size of its army required its presence in the homeland for defense of its borders.
Mr. Jebb suggested that in connection with the countries in the third category stronger language should be devised to provide for the action that would be taken in the event of an attack on one of these states, suggesting some such words as “to consult together to decide what measures would be necessary to restore the situation”. Mr. Kennan welcomed this suggestion, stating that an important objective of these Talks was to establish a relationship between the treaty members and those nations outside the fold, pointing out that it is not a mutual assistance pact with these nations that is desired. He also went on to say that the relationship of the nations in the second category would not be of a bilateral nature but would be with the North Atlantic group signatory to the new treaty. In this connection, Mr. Hickerson pointed out that such a relationship, for example, would make it easier for Denmark to offer facilities and bases in Greenland.
Turning to the question of Italy, Mr. Hickerson stated that the U.S. Government preferred that the European nations take the initiative in solving the problem of Italy’s relationship to a North Atlantic arrangement. Mr. Kennan said that he could see certain advantages with Italy excluded from the arrangement, in as much as there was a certain danger in incorporating states which lay so close to the Soviet orbit. Moreover, he added, it hardly has any other choice but to remain with the Western Powers; further, it can contribute little in the way of military power. Mr. Hickerson stated that he personally felt that Italy should be brought into the Brussels Union, but, as a demilitarized state, should not be invited to participate in the military staff talks now proceeding in London. To an inquiry by Mr. Hoyer Millar, Mr. Hickerson [Page 228] said that in effect the United States Government would wish to see some satisfactory solution to this Italian problem before the United States entered a North Atlantic arrangement.
Mr. Hoyer Millar expressed the opinion that the working group had now provided a good outline of the projected pact itself, of the relationship which the United States and Canada will have vis-à-vis the European countries in the pact, but that a more precise definition of the relationship of the Category II countries to the pact and their actual obligations would be required.