740.00119 Council/4–2148: Telegram
The Minister in Austria (Erhardt) to the Secretary of State
priority
514. We concur in view set forth in Delsec 16701 that Soviets probably wish to conclude treaty now and that their motive is belief that Soviet objective in Austria, whether it be gradual pressure and infiltration or rapid seizure of power, can be more effectively pursued if western occupation forces are withdrawn. Soviets have now substantial control and potential exclusive domination over eastern zone but are apparently willing to gamble this present capability in exchange for possible capture of whole country.
On the other hand, we consider that, in view of strategic penetration of Austria into Soviet sphere and obvious danger of allowing it to become firmly knit into ERP and perhaps Western Union, Soviets will press Austrian issue to conclusion as rapidly as overall developments permit. If they encounter serious delays in securing troop evacuation, they may conclude that partition, along lines suggested Legtel 366, March 24,2 is only certain means of assuring continued economic and political control of eastern zone.
As to Austrian attitudes, there is little question that, should Soviets make in present treaty negotiations extensive concessions necessary to meet conditions Austrian Government has fixed, Austrian population would feel there was no longer any excuse for delay in long sought withdrawal of occupation forces. There is, moreover, widespread conviction here that Austrian economic recovery cannot take place and ERP be really effective as long as Soviets occupy eastern provinces. On other hand, we can by no means be certain that Austrian leaders are justified in their belief that Austria, even with Austrian army in being and present strongly anti-Communist government in office, could resist indefinitely internal and external pressures which would probably be applied after troop withdrawal.
Question for decision by western powers would under this analysis be whether (a) to conclude treaty, withdraw forces, and risk possibility of Communist capture of country, or (b) to break off treaty negotiations on grounds which, in view of extensive Soviet concessions, may appear insubstantial, to prolong presence of Red Army in Austria and risk Soviet partition of country.
In light of all factors as seen from Vienna, preponderant advantages would seem to favor following: (1) force all possible concessions from Soviets during present treaty negotiations but, if Soviets make every concession that can be asked, ultimately sign treaty; (2) delay [Page 1500] ratification as long as there seems any justification for so doing; (3) in meantime energetically knit Austria into structure of western European cooperation; (4) strengthen Austrian army and police so that before departure of western troops probably a year hence both are fully prepared to meet emergencies; (5) before final evacuation of troops give Austrian Government public guarantee on part of principal western European powers and US that they will assist by all means at their disposal in case Austrian sovereignty or independence is threatened.
This recommendation is made on assumption that, in event of border incursions into Austria by satellite neighbors or major Soviet-instigated internal disorders, Congress could be prevailed upon to vote grants for Austria under Truman Doctrine (additional to ERP assistance), as country threatened in same manner as Greece and Turkey. We would recognize moreover that dependence of Austrian economy on West rather than on Danube Basin was artificial and probably transitory but would consider it essential as long as Soviet domination of remainder of Basin continued unrelaxed.
It should be emphasized that above recommendation is in essence proposal to base Austrian security, after current year, on military guarantee from West rather than on presence of Western forces in Austria. Alternative would appear to be at best continued political and economic insecurity resulting from presence of Soviet troops and at worst total absorption of eastern Austria, including Vienna, into Soviet sphere.
Sent Department 514; repeated London USDel 121.