740.00119 Council/3–448: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

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875. Delsec 1612. 1. This is second message on status of Ruhr discussion.1 It deals with points which as of the close of today’s plenary session were disagreed. Paragraphs 5, 8 and 10 of the report of the working party are involved.

2. With respect to paragraph 5 the British at today’s plenary session submitted the following new text:

“The functions of the international control agency shall, in the light of existing or future international agreements, be as follows:

(A).
To make allocations of coal, coke and steel from the Ruhr as between German consumption and export, in order to insure adequate access to supplies of these products for the free countries of Europe as well as for Germany; and, subject to the provisions of paragraph 8 below, to insure the fulfillment of the terms of such allocations.
(B).
Subject to the provisions of paragraph 8 below, to prevent the German Govt or German management from instituting or carrying out artificial measures or practices in connection with the movement of these products in international trade.
(C)
To exercise such controls as are provided for in paragraph 8 below.”

With respect to (A) the US proposed to amend the text by striking “make” and inserting “control the making of”, and by inserting after “German consumption and export”, “as may be necessary”. The French insist on the British language with respect to the first amendment; The British will accept either; Benelux prefer the British but will probably accept either. The clause starting “in order to” with or without the US amendment is objectionable to the French and probably to Benelux as representing a curtailment of the powers of the agency. It reflects a position taken strongly by the US and accepted by the UK that the agency shall not have the power to restrict the quantity of these products exported from the Ruhr.

With respect to (B) the US will propose to strike “in connection with the” and to substitute “which interfere with the normal”. This draft omits the last clause of the original US proposal reading “and [Page 127] to assure to the governments and nationals of other countries nondiscriminatory access to these products on terms of equality with German nationals or authorities”. We are disposed to accept the deletion. This arises out of a growing concern, which we shall want to express with respect to the paragraph as it now stands, with the unfavorable position in which these restrictions may place German management until nations which trade with Germany have agreed to apply the principles of the ITO or the GATT to Germany. Except for these US amendments we believe the paragraph is agreed although the UK may propose to strike it on the technical ground that the subject matter is covered in paragraph 8.

The US has a technical amendment to this paragraph (C) to which the UK has informally agreed which would make it read “to exercise such controls as are assigned to it in accordance with the terms in paragraph 8 below”.

3. In this afternoon’s meeting the British proposed the following text for paragraph 8: “During the same phase the commanders-in-chief concerned will maintain such control over the Ruhr coal, coke and steel industries as may be necessary to ensure (a) that the export commitments of Germany are carried out, (b) that the mandatory requirements of the occupying powers are met, (c) that the disarmament provisions of present agreements or of a future treaty are not infringed thereby, (d) that the German Government or German management do not institute or carry out artificial measures or practices in connection with the movement in international trade of coal, coke and steel from the Ruhr.

“The powers as under (a) and (d) shall at the end of the period in which the allied powers exercise supreme authority in Germany be transferred to the international control agency. The powers exercised by the occupying authorities under (c) shall at a time to be decided, be transferred to such authority, or authorities, as may be designated by international agreement to ensure the continued demilitarization and disarmament of Germany.”

The US will propose a technical amendment to strike in the first sentence “commanders-in-chief” and substitute “the occupying authorities”. The US will also propose to amend (a) by inserting after “Germany” the words “as determined by the International Control Agency”. Both these changes were agreed by the working party this morning and it is believed their omission in the British draft was accidental. The US will make the same proposals with respect to (d) as have been discussed under 5 (b).

Except for these comments it is believed that 8 is all agreed up to the last sentence. Herein lies the widest difference of opinion thus far. This language is a US proposal which is not acceptable to the French [Page 128] or to Benelux who wish the powers under (c) to be transferred to the International Control Agency.

This afternoon the UK proposed as a compromise to strike the last sentence and amend the first sentence to read “the powers as under (a), (c) and (d) shall, at the end of the period in which the allied powers exercise supreme authority in Germany, be transferred to the International Control Agency, except insofar as, especially in the case of (c), other arrangements for achieving these purposes may be laid down in the peace settlement or by other international agreement”. The US proposed that the last sentence be amended to read “The powers exercised by the occupying authorities under (c) shall be transferred to such authority as may by the terms of a peace settlement or other international agreement be designated for the purpose, provided that if no such authority is established the powers herein mentioned shall be transferred to the International Control Agency”. Neither proposal was accepted by the French or Benelux representatives but they were not rejected. Their desire to see this power lodged in this agreement in the agency derives from a fear that other arrangements may not be made and from a strong feeling that even if other arrangements are made the life expectancy of the International Control Agency is substantially better than that of any body set up for disarmament purposes for all of Germany.

4. Today the UK proposed and the US accepted a revised version of the original US draft on paragraph 10 reading as follows:

“This agreement shall not prejudice the conclusion of subsequent arrangements for the better coordination of the Ruhr coal, coke and steel resources with those of other areas. Any such subsequent agreement would not invalidate so far as the Ruhr is concerned the provisions agreed to herein”.

The French and Benelux representatives requested time to consider this proposal. Heretofore they have agreed in principle but objected strongly to the inclusion in this agreement of a provision which suggests that the agency set up by it and considered by them permanent might be superseded.

Douglas
  1. See telegram 876, Delsec 1611, supra.