Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Council/3–648: Telegram

The United States Deputy for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers ( Reber ) to the Secretary of State

top secret   us urgent
niact

London , March 6, 1948—1 p. m.

899. Delsec 1614. From Reber. Dept will note from Delsec 1615, March 5¹ on 72d meeting that critical phase of discussions has now been reached. Soviet representative has sought to establish that Soviet proposal is marked concession and clear proof of Soviet desire to obtain agreement Austrian treaty, while continued support of French proposal by western powers in spite of Soviet rejection in December indicates that western powers do not desire treaty. Soviet representative has avoided stating that USSR will not negotiate differences. It is now clear that he will not make first move, but is endeavoring to demonstrate that other delegates have taken step backward thus securing considerable tactical and propaganda advantages in Austria.

French and British have been trying continuously get a lead from USDel on concessions which might be made to meet Soviet position and keep negotiations from breaking down. Under instructions in Deptel 571, February 19² however I do not feel that I am authorized to carry “probing” to point of taking lead on any upward revision, either with French and British or in quadripartite meeting.

Since Dept desires discussions to continue pending JCS decision (Deptel 746, March 4³) and since impasse may develop at stage when Soviets have tactical and propaganda advantage, I recommend that I be authorized to use proposals of February 11 memo on oil and DDSG.⁴ If compromise along these lines could be suggested at next meeting by one of western delegations we might possibly shift to Soviet representative burden of demonstrating his asserted desire to reach agreement. At same time our continued adherence to February 6 memo on lump sum and supremacy of Austrian law would serve to prevent any possible development toward compromise from outstripping JCS decision as well as affording a sounder basis for western position on completion of treaty.

Sent Niact to Dept as 899, repeated to Vienna as 19; Vienna pass to USFA.

[ Reber ]

1. Not printed.
2. Not printed; it allowed the U.S. delegate to negotiate within the limits of the February 6 memorandum (p. 1457) and instructed Reber to adhere as closely as possible to the French proposal on German assets. The delegation was to refer all concessions to the Department for final approval. (740.00119 Council/2–1948)
3. Supra.
4. Not printed; the memorandum under reference outlined the maximum concessions on German assets as follows: the right of the Soviet Union to 58% of Austrian oil production, 50% of the exploration rights, 50% of the refining capacity, and 25% of the DDSG in the Eastern Zone of Austria (740.0011 EW (Peace)/2–1148).