740.00119 Control (Austria)/2–648: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Austria

secret

105. From the Secretary for Erhardt and Keyes. I consider this session of Deputies as decisive in determining whether settlement of Austrian treaty can be reached at an early date, permitting termination of military occupation and restoration of full independence to Austrian Govt. Preliminary discussions with Brit and French are necessary prior to meeting of Deputies in order that Western States may have a clear idea of the implications of the Soviet proposals and [Page 1460] a clear and coordinated policy if the Soviets are inclined to negotiate their proposals with a view to a settlement acceptable to all Govts concerned. I hope a settlement can be reached which assures Austria’s political and economic independence and does not place burdens on the Austrian economy which are inconsistent both with our international agreements and with the requirements of peaceful reconstruction.

I realize the difficulties in reaching such a settlement and the Austrian impatience to bring to an end military occupation and zonal division of their country. At the same time, US public opinion would be reluctant to accept a settlement at such a price as to place Austria in a position of dependence on the Eastern European bloc or impose any charge on the Austrian economy beyond its capacity to finance successfully. These questions must be discussed with Brit and French and a clear understanding reached on all issues prior to the Deputies’ session.

For these reasons I recommend that you proceed London, preferably by Feb 17 to discuss with Reber the problems involved in the negotiations and to join in preliminary talks with Brit and French. I leave to your discretion length of time it will be necessary for you to remain London. If Soviets adopt an active policy in Austria, simultaneous with London conference, designed to swing Austrian Govt to support of their proposed settlement or to blame Western powers for any possible breakdown in negotiations, your return may be necessary to prevent development of a political situation adversely affecting US interests. You will best be able to determine how long you may wish to remain in London.

I should appreciate an early reply so that necessary arrangements may be made in London.

Marshall