740.00119 Control (Austria)/1–2148: Telegram
The Minister in Austria ( Erhardt ) to the Secretary of State
74. Soviet attitude on treaty continues to be subject of intense and diverse speculation here.
As reported Legtel 61, January 17,2 unverified rumors allege Soviet proposal on German assets already submitted to Austrian Communists and that latter have been instructed by Moscow to take line in propaganda that Russia and Russia alone is prepared to make treaty along reasonable lines. Rumors borne out to some extent by Communist propaganda that “Soviet Union is only power that wants to give Austrian treaty really assuring freedom and independence” (Volksstimme, January 21) and that other parties are opposing treaty because they desire western imperialist control of Austria.
In contradiction of Communist line concerning reasonableness of impending Soviet proposals, rumors allege that quid pro quo for treaty will be Austrian commitment to conclude with eastern neighbors economic agreements whereunder bulk of Austrian raw materials and manufactured products would be allocated for delivery to east, thus drawing Austria into Soviet economic bloc.
In conversation recently between Herz of Legation and Ernst Fischer, latter expressed optimism over concluding treaty in 1948 because Austrian Government will find “it worth heavy price to get occupation troops out of Austria.” He added it would be worth heavy price to get troops out even without treaty and expressed view Soviets might withdraw troops in absence of treaty if it were made worthwhile and if general situation in Europe quieted down.
Gruber informed us that, while he is cognizant of those rumors, he has no confirmation of their accuracy. He considers, however, that if Soviets did submit this proposal in advance to Austrian Communists, [Page 1448] it would be a favorable sign as indicating Soviet intention to offer “deal” which they thought had serious chance of acceptance. Gruber believes Soviets will submit some sort of proposal to London soon but also feels that, even should proposal provide real basis for agreement, Soviets will drag feet in negotiations in order to prolong present uncertainty which gives them additional leverage over Austrian Government in connection with current Soviet unilateral pressures.
Legation believes Soviets may well find it advantageous to submit in London proposal which does not shut door on settlement, which can be used in propaganda to portray Russian generosity and which, as Gruber suggests, can provide basis for long drawn out negotiations during which Austrian Government, and possibly western Allies, might be reluctant to resist vigorously Soviet pressures in Austria. If this analysis of Russian intentions proves correct, it would appear that sound US reaction would be, while showing perfect willingness to negotiate on basis of any reasonable Soviet proposal, to insist that Soviets can demonstrate their sincerity only by eliminating from proposal any provisions infringing on Austrian sovereignty and by permitting negotiations to be brought to rapid conclusion.