740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–2048: Telegram
The High Commissioner in Austria (Keyes) to the Secretary of State
priority
P–2155. State Department cable Marshall to Erhardt, 17 July number 641 is reference.1 It is our opinion that references to Vienna in Soviet note on Berlin represent not an immediate threat of blockade in Vienna but a warning to western powers that Soviets might apply such measures in Austria at a future date if it would serve their interests.
Possibility of Soviets extending Berlin blockade to Vienna should be gauged in light of degree to which such an extension would further Soviet objectives in (1) Germany, (2) Austria and (3) Europe in general. We assume Soviets to have one of two objectives: (1) To force [Page 1430] western powers to conference table with view to obtaining general Settlement for a unified Germany and a unified Austria, under the terms of which Soviets would participate in the control of the Ruhr and United States and United Kingdom would be forced to withdraw troops from European continent, and (2) to drive western powers from Berlin and thereby complete split of Germany. These objectives may be alternatives, with number one as primary.
If Soviet aim is unified Germany, extension of blockade to Vienna would serve only as additional pressure to bring western powers back to conference table, possibly for both German and Austrian treaties. In this connection, they undoubtedly will consider the advantages to them of dividing our effort to maintain both Berlin and Vienna with resultant possibility of our failure to maintain one or both. Although effect of such pressure must appear very great to them, they will hardly overlook fact that such measures would only serve to bring about splitting of Austria, which they have not heretofore deemed desirable. This would not be the case if Soviets restricted themselves to merely threatening blockade of Vienna. Tactical value to Soviets of threat merits serious consideration. This may be purpose of dual reference to Vienna in Soviet note. Additional important consideration in this connection is ERP, particularly in regard to Austria. Application of blockade to Vienna would wreck ERP program in Austria and, in conjunction with Berlin blockade and attendant tension and confusion in Europe generally, discourage private as well as public United States investments in Europe. If Soviets are determined to take consequences of show-down in Berlin, which could lead to war, ERP could be wrecked entirely.
If, however, Soviets have actually given up hope of both German and Austrian treaty settlements and are now committed to policy of final division of Europe, extension of blockade to Vienna would be logical tactical move and may be anticipated at any time. It is possible, however, that Soviets could give up hope for German settlement without giving up on Austria.
There have been many indications that Soviets have thus far preferred to regard Austria and Germany as separate problems. This was particularly apparent when Soviets failed here to implement travel restrictions along Berlin pattern last April. There were indications at that time that the same restrictions were only half-heartedly implemented and were subsequently dropped entirely. It appeared then that Soviet authorities locally may have pointed out to Moscow the bad effect such restrictions would have on treaty negotiations then in progress. Fact that restrictions were not imposed following breakup of treaty conference indicated, however, that policy of dealing separately with Austria and Germany was being pursued. There has since [Page 1431] then been no evidence either of a change in this policy or of Soviet intentions to blockade Vienna although capability is ever present.
Legal pretexts for extending blockade to Vienna no doubt exist, but not on German scale reference instances cited in State cable No. 641. Soviets have frequently charged western powers with violation of quadripartite agreements, but issues have been comparatively minor and in no case has reaction been comparable to that excited by the steps taken by the western powers to set up a provisional western German government, or by the introduction of the currency reform for the western zones. Emphasis on “separate action” by western powers “in western zone of Germany” in Soviet note is pertinent. There is no comparable basis for a similar legalistic argument with regard to Vienna. The same applies to Soviet note reference to currency reform. Austrian currency reform was accomplished with quadripartite agreement. Circumstances surrounding breakup of Austrian treaty conference also less extreme than those attendant upon breakup of Foreign Minister’s conference on Germany. Fact remains, however, that Soviet delegation to Austrian treaty conference felt that it had been served with ultimatum, and this may have persuaded Soviets to change basic policy with regard to Austria.
The likelihood of a Soviet blockade of Vienna cannot be estimated from the current local situation. There are no indications of Soviet intentions to institute blockade, and there are no serious disagreements in the Allied Commission for Austria which involve allegations of unilateral action by western powers in violation of quadripartite agreements. However, since Soviet action could be taken without prior warning, likelihood of blockade still must be considered a possibility particularly if Soviets choose to consider agreements on occupation of Germany and Austria as a single agreement, or if they should announce the application of ECA in Austria as a violation of quadripartite agreements. It is believed that steps which might be taken to forestall or delay blockade are limited to those which could be taken at United States Government level since our situation in Vienna does not provide us opportunity for retaliation or other counter-measures.
In view of foregoing, we feel that probabilities favor earliest possible resumption of Austrian treaty negotiations as best means of averting extension of blockade to Vienna. If overtures were made they would, at least, force Soviets to show their hand on their real objective. Assuming opportunity given for resumption of treaty talks without loss of prestige, Soviet refusal would indicate new policy for final division of Europe and elimination of western enclaves in Berlin and Vienna, PolAd concurs.