740.00119 Control (Austria)/3–2448: Telegram
The Minister in Austria ( Erhardt ) to the Secretary of State
366. In view anticipated breakdown Austrian treaty negotiations outstanding question here becomes that of Soviet intentions thereafter. Their capabilities, excluding for present two extremes of armed action against western forces in Austria or sharp shift toward conciliation would seem to offer them choice of following alternatives: (1) continuation and intensification of strategy pursued prior to opening of London negotiations or (2) new strategy aimed at bringing about by one means or other early partition of Austria.
- 1.
- As Department is aware Soviets have for some time followed here strategy whereunder obstacles were placed in way of economic recovery of Austria, loot drained away to east and propaganda directed against Austrian Government and western Allies, but no drastic step taken to alter balance of political forces in Austria. This strategy presumably had two objectives: (a) to provide economic benefits to Soviets and (b) to build up Communist strength victory in country as a whole. There have been several indications in recent months that Soviets consider this strategy has reached end its usefulness. Soviet treaty proposals may have been effort to shift attack by bringing about evacuation occupation forces and thereby facilitating application Czech technique to Austria. That effort having failed it seems doubtful Soviets will be satisfied for more than brief period to return to previous inconclusive strategy which has ceased to pay dividends.
- 2.
- Only feasible alternative excluding extremes mentioned in
first paragraph above would appear to be strategy aimed at
consolidation Soviet position in eastern Austria, though
considerable choice is open as to both means and tempo.
- a.
- First possibility would be direct action by Soviet military authorities toward tightening controls over economic provincial and local government and police administration of eastern zone, destroying authority of Austrian Government in that zone and in Vienna and perhaps ending quadripartite cooperation by withdrawing from AC. This strategy would have disadvantage from Russian point of view that it would require open initiative by Soviets rather than by indigenous “democratic” elements and would enhance difficulty of laying blame for partition on western powers.
- b.
- Second possibility would be action by Austrian Communists supported more or less covertly by Soviets, to spread confusion and disorder in eastern zone and Vienna and ultimately so harass and intimidate Austrian Government that it would withdraw to Salzburg. This strategy would have disadvantage from Soviet point of view that, if western powers provide necessary assistance to Austrian Government [Page 1415] weak Austrian Communists might be unable to carry through attack successfully without open Soviet support.
- c.
- Legation inclined to consider most likely Soviet strategy for immediate future, commencing with close of London negotiations to be one which involves preparatory and exploratory steps along lines of both 2 a and b, proceeding at rapidly accelerated rate if effective counteraction does not emerge. While probability seems to favor indecisive probing for present it must be recognized that if Soviets determine at all cost to carry strategy to logical conclusion they could probably bring about de facto partition of country in relatively short time.
In our view most effective short term US action to meet these eventualities would be along lines of three points listed in concluding paragraph of Legtel 343, March 19:1 (1) prompt establishment of food reserve in Vienna to enable US element to assist Socialists in retaining control of trade unions; (2) distribution of arms, including automatic weapons, to Austrian police and perhaps later to other Austrian units (this matter is being currently considered by USFA); (3) issuance of joint statement by three western powers at or shortly after close of London negotiations stating unequivocally that they will remain in Austria until satisfactory treaty is concluded and that they will in meantime take whatever steps may prove necessary to assist Austrian Government in preserving independence sovereignty and unity of country. For longer term we urge every possible step to initiate Austria firmly into all phases of Western European Union.
Sent Department 366; repeated London USDel 74.
- Not printed.↩