Vienna Legation Files: Lot 55F74: Box 3160
The Minister in Austria (Erhardt) to the Secretary of State
No. 315
Subject: The Security of Austria.
Sir: I have the honor to submit the following statement of the problem of Austrian security. The statement comprises first, a general survey of present conditions and, second, a series of recommendations, for United States policy and action.
I. General Survey
- A.
-
Soviet Capabilities. Austrian security is at
present largely conditioned by Soviet policy and any survey of this
problem must therefore begin with an estimate of Soviet capabilities
and intentions in Austria.
It is impossible for the Soviets directly to take over the whole of Austria as long as the U.S., British and French forces remain in the Western Zones, without clear likelihood of provoking a general war. It would also be impossible for the Austrian Communists in their present state of impotence to take over even Eastern Austria without Soviet assistance. It might, however, be possible for the Soviets to partition the country and destroy the authority of the Austrian Government in the Eastern Zone by any one of a number of means, such as: (1) a sudden coup carried out openly by the Soviet occupation [Page 1404] forces; (2) a sudden coup carried out ostensibly by the Austrian Communists and armed USIA factory guards supported covertly by the Soviets; (3) the gradual and progressive exercise of pressure, sabotage and intimidation leading eventually, if uninterrupted, to economic and political breakdown.
It should be emphasized that the Austrian Government unassisted would at present be unable to resist successfully any one of these three tactics and that, even when its police are adequately armed, it would be able to cope only with the second. It should also be emphasized that the mere presence of small Western forces in Vienna does not guarantee that any one of these tactics would or could be thwarted. Only a clear indication by the Western powers that they are determined to prevent, by economic and political means if possible but by force if necessary, the partition of Austria could give even reasonable assurance that the Soviets would not attempt to exploit their capabilities to this extreme.
On the other hand, it is always conceivable that the Soviets might for tactical reasons, turn to a policy of conciliation in Austria. They could abandon the Yugoslav claims and reopen the treaty negotiations. They could propose the withdrawal or reduction in size of the occupation armies. They could offer to turn back to Austria all or part of the USIA properties and reduce occupation costs. They could make available to Austria considerable quantities of foodstuffs from the satellites and from Russia herself. If they considered such dramatic steps unnecessary, they could still prolong for a further period of months their present policy of exerting oil the Austrian economy and Government a pressure which is harassing and costly but still bearable and inconclusive.
It would obviously be foolhardy to make, solely on the basis of conditions here, any confident prediction of future Soviet policy in Austria, since that policy will be determined largely by over-all considerations. A few comments can, however, be made. First, it seems unlikely that the Soviets would wish to incur serious risk of war over Austria, since it is doubtful that their position here is of such overriding importance to them and since there is reason to believe they expect the country, because of its geographical location and its historic associations with the Danubian states, to fall into their sphere eventually in any case. On the other hand, the projection deep into their sphere of a democratic country with an outspokenly anti-Communist Government and Western armed forces at its capital, must seem to them militarily dangerous and politically outrageous. Furthermore, it could hardly be expected that they would sit quietly by during the coming critical months and permit Austria, without serious opposition, to be integrated more and more closely into the Western European community.
[Page 1405]A plausible estimate of Soviet intentions might therefore be: (1) that they would not continue for long the relatively passive policy which they have pursued recently, (2) that they would utilize their extensive capabilities to endeavor to oust the Austrian Government and Western forces from Eastern Austria without war and (3) that they would refrain from pressing their capabilities to the limit only if they were made clearly to understand in time that such action would involve grave risk of war. I believe these conclusions to be valid unless the Soviet Union has already decided either to launch a war in the near future or to follow an over-all policy of conciliation toward the West.
- B.
-
Political Conditions in Austria. The Austrian
Government and the two political parties which compose it are
strongly anti-Communist and pro-Western. They occasionally
over-estimate their ability to deal bilaterally with the Russians
(some of the Socialist leaders are still attracted to the idea of a
“neutral” Austria unattached to either East or West) but they are
showing courage and persistence in resisting Soviet pressure. The
two parties dislike each other and will eventually revert to bitter
hostility, but as long as the Soviet menace remains acute they seem
likely to stand together on vital issues. The Communists are a
negligible element and will remain so unless it should appear that
all or part of the country is likely to be abandoned by the West, in
which case they could recruit numerous opportunists. The only
serious dangers the Government has to face are (1) Soviet aggression
or (2) economic difficulties so grave that substantial numbers of
the workers might desert the Socialists for the Communists.
It must be emphasized, however, that the Austrian policy of courageous, even aggressive, resistance to Soviet pressure is based on the assumption that the Western powers have, at least for the present, assumed a tacit commitment to defend Austria against Soviet attack or subversion and to provide enough economic assistance to permit the reconstruction of its economy and a subsequent gradually rising standard of living. If this assumption should prove to be ill-founded, the Austrian Government would in an emergency be obliged either to make a right-about face toward the East or to flee to Salzburg.
- C.
- Economic Conditions in Austria. The economic situation in Austria has improved considerably in the last year both as a result of the U.S. aid programs and of hard work by the Austrian people. That the situation is still far from stable, however, is demonstrated by the fact that the normal ration is still only 1800 calories, that shortfalls even on this inadequate ration led to serious unrest among the Vienna workers only three months ago, that deliveries of indigenous agricultural products are still far less than pre-war, that U.S. aid has therefore necessarily been primarily in the form of food so that too little [Page 1406] assistance has been directed to essential industrial rehabilitation, and that as a result of this and other factors Austrian exports; are still well below the level necessary to make the country reasonably self-supporting. Real Austrian recovery is therefore still largely dependent upon the successful implementation of ERP (Public Law 472).
- D.
- Western Capabilities and Intentions. It is apparent, if the above analysis is correct, that the maintenance of Austrian economic and political stability depends on the Western powers in at least three vital respects; (1) making clear to the Soviets in time that an attempt on their part to engineer a putsch would involve serious risk of war, (2) supporting the Austrian Government effectively in its resistance to more gradual pressures (e.g., the Marek case) which might in the long run result in subversion or partition, and (3) supplying economic aid on scale sufficient to permit a progressive economic recovery and a decent standard of living. Unless the Western powers, and primarily the U.S., are prepared to follow through on these three points, Austria will continue to be one of the “soft spots” of Europe and Eastern Austria will be open to sudden absorption into the Soviet sphere.
II. Recommendations for United States Policy and Action
A. Maintenance of Political Stability.
1. Take a firm position with leaders of both major parties that the coalition must be maintained.
2. Assist in arming and training the Austrian police. If the Austrian police are prepared to cope with disorders which are not openly supported by the Soviets, the necessity for direct intervention by Western forces will be correspondingly reduced. At the same time discreet support should be given to Austrian preparations for organizing an army in order that the army might be quickly brought into existence in case of termination of the occupation.
3. In accordance with the provisions of the Control Agreement continue to turn over to the Austrian Government all possible functions and authority and to reduce the burdens of occupation. Implementation of this policy is particularly necessary in view of the prolongation of the occupation and the Austrian Government’s efforts to demonstrate to its people that the Western powers are remaining not as conquerors but as protectors of the country.
B. Maintenance of Economic Stability.
4. Carry out the ERP programs in Austria in such a way that the Austrian economy will be made more self-sustaining, Austria will be knit more firmly into the economy of Western Europe and the standard of living will be raised. In order to attain these objectives it is necessary (1) that ERP allocations be adequate, (2) that they contain sufficient [Page 1407] provision for industrial and agricultural rehabilitation as distinct from relief supplies, (3) that the special schilling deposits under ERP be utilized for capital purposes rather than be permitted to become a serious fiscal or deflationary burden on the economy, (4) that special efforts be made to develop Austria’s economic relations with OEEC countries, particularly her immediate neighbors—Trizone Germany and Italy.
C. Neutralization of Soviet Capabilities.
5. Observe the Control Agreement and support the Allied Council as a continuing basis for whatever degree of quadripartite cooperation remains. The only reservation which this recommendation requires is that we do not permit the Soviets, through their violation and our observance of the Control Agreement, substantially to improve their position here at our or Austrian expense.
6. Neutralize insofar as possible Soviet economic advantages in Austria (1) by implementing the “strategic control plan” so that there will be available in or near Austria from sources under our control sufficient quantities of key commodities, particularly oil and coal, to check any Soviet effort to blackmail the Austrian Government by cutting off supplies of these commodities, (2) by taking all reasonable precautions that imports from the United States and from elsewhere under ERP are denied USIA industries except where limited amounts of such imports may be needed to assure the supply of vital commodities to the Austrian market, (3) by aiding the Austrians to resist Soviet efforts to remove alleged German assets and war booty from Austria, (4) by observing closely economic arrangements between Austria and the satellites in order to see to it that, while trade with the East particularly in foodstuffs is expanded, Austria does not become wholly dependent on one or more of these countries for any essential supplies.
7. Display toward the Soviets in Vienna absolute firmness on all major issues affecting the position of the Western powers in Austria, the stability of the Austrian Government and the integrity of the country. Only by responding to Soviet probing and pressure with firmness and assurance can we hope to convince them that aggression in Austria involves risk of war and therefore, in all probability, is not worth the candle. However, we should explore all possible alternatives to a stalemate. For examples: Should the Soviets interfere with passenger and freight transport between Western Austria and Vienna, there is a possibility we could operate with Austrian railroads and through Austrian channels. Should the Soviets insist on inspections of military trains there is the British precedent here which accepts it since their trains also carry Austrian civilian passengers. Such compromises should, nevertheless, be a last resort since there is a [Page 1408] stronger legal basis, i.e., the Control Agreement and Allied Council decisions for our present policy than exists in Germany.
8. Seize every opportunity to bind Austria more closely, economically, politically and militarily, to the Western European community. As long as Austria is an isolated and exposed fragment projecting into the Soviet sphere, only continued occupation by Western forces and an explicit commitment by the West to maintain its position in Austria will afford even temporary security. Long-term security, in the absence of occupation forces, can only be achieved by association of Austria with Western Europe sufficiently close and concrete to make it apparent that an attack on Austria is an attack on the whole body of Europe. Meanwhile we should explore and, if possible develop, political warfare techniques which will halt Soviet tactics of infiltration and prevent Communists from taking over from inside. (There is an identity of educational and language background of many Austrian Communists with Communists in the satellite states of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia, reaching back to the Habsburgs. Fortunately, it works both ways. If Tito was educated in Vienna and speaks the Viennese dialect, De Gasperi was once a member of the Austrian Parliament and Vice Chancellor Sehaerf served in the Yugoslav Army.)
9. When progress has been made in implementation of the policies outlined above (especially 2, 4 and 8) to afford a reasonable guarantee of Austrian security, reopen the Austrian treaty negotiations with a view to the evacuation of Eastern Austria by the Soviet Army.
Respectfully yours,