Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

501.BC/11–2548: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

top secret
us urgent

Washington, November 25, 1948—4 p. m.

Gadel 586. For Jessup and Bohlen Eyes Only. Your understanding of our policy with respect to settlement of Berlin question before UN (re Delga 912¹) is confirmed along following lines:

1. US stands on position which Pres and Secretary have frequently stated, in particular in our notes of Sept 22 and 26,² that we will not be forced out of Berlin. This policy has full bi-partisan support.

2. US wishes settle Berlin question by securing lifting of blockade.

3. We will not buy such settlement through appeasement or through repudiation of our basic thesis that we will not resume negotiations under duress.

4. We are still prepared to have Soviet mark introduced as sole currency of Berlin under four-power control of its introduction and continued supply provided blockade is lifted.

5. We recognize that recent Soviet actions in Berlin leading to splitting of city greatly increase difficulties of finding formula on currency which will give reasonable protection to our interests.

6. It must be recognized that following elections of Dec 5 division of city will probably be complete and that this factor should be borne in mind in working out SC recommendations including any currency plan under four-power control. We note that three power answer to Bramuglia³ raises this issue.

7. While these developments increase the difficulties they do not introduce a wholly new element in the sense that we have long recognized that no matter how good a technical plan is agreed there remains a certain risk that Sovs could manipulate situation to hamper our position in Berlin. We must however take all reasonable precautions to reduce this risk through good offices of neutrals, through safeguards in agreement designed to prevent its becoming in Sov hands an instrument of economic strangulation, and through reserving our right to regain free hand if Sovs breach agreement. We will not be traded out of Berlin.

8. US is still prepared in negotiations for a currency solution to operate on basis of agreed three power interpretation of principles contained in Aug 30 directive. We do not however admit that this directive constitutes a binding international agreement.

9. We continue to have in mind possibility that neutral financial experts might themselves evolve currency plan which SC would ask us to accept and which we would be prepared to do whether or not it met all of our views in their entirety provided foregoing principles are maintained. We would be justified in insisting that SC supervise for specified period operation of any such currency scheme in order to insure its faithful observance, along lines suggested in Delga 917.⁴ Any SC proposal should make provision that currency plan should not be utilized to interfere with trade and that Western Powers should control proceeds of imports.

10. In submitting Berlin case to SC we accepted risk that SC might ask us to accept some solution which we did not consider 100% perfect. Our principal safeguards against such risk lie in understanding of our position and realities of Berlin problem by neutrals, provisions designed to prevent perversion of agreement, and reservation of our rights if Sovs break agreement (see para 7).

11. Our experts while endeavoring to secure the best possible solution cannot refuse to go along with any alternatives proposed by experts of the Six which safeguard basic principles of our position and with understanding that SC assumed responsibility for fulfillment. Since failing successful progress in SC activities we must proceed to introduction of Western Mark as sole currency of Berlin, by Dec 20 at latest, we are under special obligation to lend every assistance to SC and to urge upon it importance of proceeding with all maximum speed.

12. In regard to combination of work on currency plan with idea of staggered lifting of blockade, some arrangement along these lines is not to be excluded provided proposal is prepared in such a way as to emphasize that blockade is actually being lifted and that any resumption thereof in case of breakdown of currency plan would constitute Sov disregard of views of SC and would free our hand (e.g. introduction of Western currency).

We emphasize again and suggest you discuss with neutrals fact that process of obtaining our assent in principle to a proposal before acceptance in principle by Sovs tends to put us at disadvantage of having accepted proposal which is then rejected by Sovs but is thereafter used as starting point for new round of negotiations.

While, of course, we should wish to review any scheme proposed by neutrals before authorizing you formally to accept, we are confident that these instructions, which are tentative pending receipt of Bohlen’s cable⁵ which we understand you are discussing today, will enable you to assist in formulation of an acceptable solution if any is at all possible.⁶

Marshall

1. Supra.
2. Ante, p. 1180 and p. 1187.
3. Transmitted in Delga 890, November 23, from Paris, p. 1257.

4. the Security Council and would observe the implementation of any trade and financial committee to advise on Berlin. The committee would be responsible to the Security Council and would observe the implementation of any trade and financial agreements on Berlin. (501.BC/11–2248)

5. Not printed; but see footnote 7 to telegram Belga 912, supra.
6. Telegram Gadel 593, November 26, to Paris, not printed, advised Bohlen and Jessup that the President and the Cabinet had seen and agreed with the contents of this telegram (501.BC/11–2648).